The Tangled Threads of Ukraine and the Expansion of NATO
Therefore, Moldova does not seem to be an urgent target for the expansion of NATO, even the EU, considering that one of the main conditions for expansion is border certainty and territorial control.
Servicemen take part in a joint tactical and special exercises of the Ukrainian Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Ukrainian National Guard and Ministry Emergency in a ghost city of Pripyat, near Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant on February 4, 2022.
The war in Ukraine shows no signs of ending. The ramifications and complexity of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict are increasingly endangering global geopolitical dynamics.
Not only the costs that must be borne by the international community due to human casualties, damage to infrastructure, uncertainty in the flow of refugees, the problem of the energy (gas) crisis and the re-escalation of the arms race, the threat of instability is also starting to be felt in countries around Ukraine, especially along the border with Russia.
The root of the problem is the interpretation of the NATO membership action plan (MAP), first agreed upon at the organization's summit in Washington in 1999. MAP is a NATO program in the form of practical assistance and support for countries wishing to join this military pact.
For Russia, Ukraine's desire to become a member of NATO must be rejected, thus if military intervention was delayed, the national security would appear to be placed in a dangerous situation.
Lining up for NATO
Participation in MAP does not necessarily prejudge the country's decision to join the military pact. Ukraine's membership status must go through a rigorous process, based on the experience of the accession process of the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland in 1999, the three countries that entered the first wave of NATO’s post-Cold War expansion.
Subsequently, Albania and Croatia joined in 2009, Montenegro in 2017 and Macedonia also in 2017. Bosnia and Herzegovina was invited to MAP in 2010, but has not yet made any decision
In the second wave, seven other European countries joined, namely Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia (2004). Subsequently, Albania and Croatia joined in 2009, Montenegro in 2017 and Macedonia also in 2017. Bosnia and Herzegovina was invited to MAP in 2010, but has not yet made any decision.
Even though MAP is strictly enforced, in reality, since 1999 the membership of NATO has grown rapidly, from 12 to 30 countries. Russia does not actually really "object" to this development because so far the main countries, such as Kazakhstan, Belarus and Ukraine that share its borders are still "neutral".
Also read:
> Russia-Ukraine Conflict at an Impasse
> OPINION Russia-Ukraine: Security Dilemma
The problem is, besides Ukraine, there are currently a number of other NATO aspirants, such as Moldova, Sweden and Finland, even Serbia, Ireland and Georgia that also want, or are in the process of, joining NATO.
There is no denying that since the end of the Cold War — which resulted in the breakup of the Soviet Union — Russia has become very sensitive to the issue of NATO expansion. Anders As Lund and Andrew Kuchins in their book The Russia Balance Sheet (2009) said, by realpolitik standards, Russian leaders measured countries according to their power and influence. Russia wants ex-Soviet countries to "consult" with Moscow on foreign policy issues and military alliances with third parties.
A convoy of Russian armored vehicles moves along a highway in Crimea, Jan. 18, 2022. Amid a buildup of Russian troops near Ukraine, Moscow has denied planning an attack on Ukraine but urged the U.S. and its allies to provide a binding pledge that NATO won't expand to Ukraine and won't deploy military assets there _ a demand rejected by the West.
Russia seems to be prepared at all costs to try and prevent the defense pact effort, as evidenced by its invasion of Georgia in 2008, which became the first war in Europe in the 21st century. Russia currently occupies 20 percent of Georgia's territory and does not allow European Union (EU) monitoring teams to enter the disputed enclaves of South Ossetia and Abkhazia.
Ramifications and complexity
As is the case with Georgia and Ukraine (with the de facto territory of Crimea and Donbas, which are already occupied by Russia), a number of NATO aspirant countries have "enclaves" in which Moscow has an interest. In Ukraine, for example, apart from the southern and eastern regions, in the northwest there is the landlocked area of Transnistria sandwiched between its border and Moldova, which is a constitutionally neutral country. De facto, Transnistria is an independent territory, but is internationally recognized as part of Moldova. Since 1992, the region has been controlled by pro-Russian separatists.
Just as the United States has long stationed about 1,500 troops in Ukraine under the MAP program, Russia also has 1,500-2,000 troops in Transnistria, with the mandate to guard the Soviet Union's military depot in Cobasna.
Transnistria, like Abkhkasia, South Ossetia and Artakh in Armenia, is known as a frozen conflict area after the Soviet Union. Uniquely, Transnistria has so far held close ties and cooperation in the social, cultural, and economic fields with Ukraine and Russia, as well as the military with Moscow. Just as the United States has long stationed about 1,500 troops in Ukraine under the MAP program, Russia also has 1,500-2,000 troops in Transnistria, with the mandate to guard the Soviet Union's military depot in Cobasna.
For this reason, US National Intelligence Director Avril Haines has expressed confidence in the US Senate that the conflict in Ukraine will drag on because President Putin's ambitions are not limited to controlling the Donbas region (Balkan Insight/BIRN, 11/5/2022).
Since the beginning of the Ukraine war, Russia has also been bombarding and occupying the largest port city of Odessa, which is only 160 kilometers from Transnistria and 400 km from the Crimean Peninsula. As one of the poorest countries in Europe with a 100 percent gas dependence on Russia, according to Tatiana Kulakevich of the Institute on Russia University of South Florida, Transnistria is an ideal place to besiege Ukraine from the northwest (The Conversation, 28/4/2022).
Therefore, Moldova does not seem to be an urgent target for the expansion of NATO, even the EU, considering that one of the main conditions for expansion is border certainty and territorial control. After the "miss" in Ukraine, the target of the MAP program seems to be directed at Sweden and Finland. NATO's open-door policy in principle supports every country to join, but these two countries are a priority because of "longstanding military relations and partnerships".
Both the president and prime minister of Finland have expressed intent to submit requests to join, “without delay, in a smooth and speedy process”, and Sweden will follow in the near future (Newsweek, 12/5/2022).
A convoy of Russian armored vehicles moves along a highway in Crimea, Jan. 18, 2022. Amid a buildup of Russian troops near Ukraine, Moscow has denied planning an attack on Ukraine but urged the U.S. and its allies to provide a binding pledge that NATO won't expand to Ukraine and won't deploy military assets there _ a demand rejected by the West.
Most NATO members agree implicitly, but Hungary still has reservations, and there are fears it could deflate Finland's aspirations. According to Katalin Miklossy of the University of Finland, Hungarian President Viktor Orban is known to have a close relationship with President Putin. President Orban has even publicly expressed his objections to Ukraine's membership in NATO and is also expected to ask for additional conditions for Finland's membership (Wilson Center, 7/4/202).
Finlandization/Ukrainization?
The issue of NATO membership has put Finland at a crossroads. When deciding to join the EU in 1995 after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, according to Robin Forsberg and Jason C Moyer of the Wilson Center, Finland was faced with a difficult choice regarding its national identity: remain neutral or belong to the West. Now the choice is to remain militarily unaligned or join NATO for security. The indications are that Finland's defense needs are considered compatible with NATO, in line with the purchase of 64 super-sophisticated F-35 fighter jets.
On the other hand, Finland currently imports about 60 percent of its energy needs from Russia. Finland also provides guarantees to Rosatom (Russian state-owned energy company), through the state-owned Fennovoima, to build nuclear power plants starting in 2023. In addition, like Ukraine, there are enclaves on its borders where Russian influence is very strong, namely Petsamo, Salla and Karelia.
For the record, during World War II, Finland, which was associated with Nazi Germany, twice fought against the Soviets. Therefore, during the Cold War, to maintain good relations with the Soviets, Finland implemented a policy of neutrality, known as Finlandization. In this neutrality, Finland implemented a foreign policy that would not be in conflict with Soviet policy so that it could enjoy peace in carrying out its diplomacy.
NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg is seen on a video screen as German Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock addresses a press conference after the informal meeting of NATO Foreign Ministers on the conflict in Ukraine on May 15, 2022 in Berlin.
Ukrainian President Volodimir Zelenskyy and US President Joe Biden must have realized that Russian President Vladimir Putin would not allow Ukraine to fall into NATO's arms even though US troops were already there. Russia will obviously use its entire sphere of influence in the Crimea, Donbas and even Transnistria, to prevent NATO's wishes. Another fact, Russia also has a separate territory, namely Kaliningrad, which is located between Poland and Lithuania. The aspirations of countries bordering Russia to become members of NATO is clearly not a simple matter. If handled carelessly it is the people of that country who are the victims, not the EU, let alone the US.
In fact, Finnish President Saulin Niinisto once said, “In situations of extreme change, we must remain level-headed” (EU Observer, 4/3/2022). Therefore, in the current context of the new Cold War, perhaps there is nothing wrong with a compromise such as Finlandization or Ukrainianization that can be considered as an alternative for a peaceful solution to the war in Ukraine. Finland's entry into NATO will add to the tangled threads of resolving the Ukraine issue, but also give rise to broader geopolitical ramifications. Russia, let alone Putin, is clearly not going to stand still.
Dian Wirengjurit
Dian Wirengjurit,Deputy Ambassador of the Republic of Indonesia to Russia (2010-2012), Geopolitical and International Relations Analyst
(This article was translated by Hyginus Hardoyo)
