Ripples in the North Natuna Sea

China is getting resentful as it sees Indonesia continuing to drill oil wells in the North Natuna Sea. The country has sent a diplomatic note protesting Indonesia’s drilling activity.

The exploration drilling was actually started in July by the United Kingdom’s operator Premier Oil, which is partly owned by Russia’s Zarubezhneft.

The drilling location is in the Tuna Block, which is part of the Indonesian Exclusive Economic Zone (ZEEI) at the northeastern end overlapping with China's Nine-Dash Line.

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> Indonesia Intensifies Presence on Natuna Sea

When Indonesia inaugurated the name North Natuna Sea on 14 July, 2017 and registered it with the United Nations, China also protested.

In fact, the reason behind the naming was to harmonize oil and gas management activities in the region. A number of oil and gas exploration and exploitation activities had previously been carried out in the working areas of North Natuna, South Natuna or North East Natuna.

ZEEI and Nine-Dash Line

Based on Article 4 of Law No. 5/1983, Indonesia has sovereign rights to explore, exploit, manage and conserve living and non-living resources of the seabed and the land beneath and above it.

The same article states that Indonesia has jurisdiction over the use of artificial islands, installations and other structures.

This is in line with Article 56 of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which China was among the first 119 signatory countries to ratify on 15 May, 1996.

China's unilaterally claimed Nine-Dash Line – having at different times also been called the Ten-Dash and even Eleven-Dash Line – is baseless with unclearly drawn coordinates.

By law, the area between the two ends of a line does not necessarily mean that a straight line can be drawn connecting them.

On the official map, the Nine-Dash Line starts from the mouth of the Gulf of Tonkin area under Hainan Island toward the North Natuna Sea to the east of Taiwan, intersecting the territories and EEZs of Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei Darussalam, the Philippines and Taiwan. By law, the area between the two ends of a line does not necessarily mean that a straight line can be drawn connecting them.

Although Article 51 of UNCLOS contains provisions on traditional fishing rights, the article only recognizes the rights of immediate adjacent neighboring states in certain areas.

The terms and conditions are regulated based on an agreement between the parties concerned. Indonesia has so far signed bilateral agreements on the issue only with Malaysia.

The International Court of Arbitration in The Hague on 11 July, 2016 ruled that China's unilateral claim regarding its Nine-Dash Line in the South China Sea (SCS) was baseless and illegitimate.

Therefore, Liu Feng, former vice president of the National Institute for South China Sea Studies conceded in 2016 that China was "the big loser in UNCLOS" because of its unfavorable geographical situation (The Diplomat, 11/7/2016). However, the “Panda Country” ignored it.

Despite having a sprawling coastline of 18,000 kilometers, China is facing hindrance to realize its maritime ambitions because it is dealing with four open seas, instead of oceans, making its maritime space “get choked".

KOMPAS/EDNA CAROLINE PATTISINA

The KRI Teuku Umar and KRI Tjiptadi warships are prepared for deployment in the TNI (Indonesian Military) Sea Combat Alert operation, which is to be reinforced by air power. A military briefing was held and led by the chief of the Joint Defense Territory Command (Kogabwilhan), Vice Adm. Yudo Margono in Natuna on Friday (3/1/2020).

In the Bohai and Yellow Seas, China faces North Korea, South Korea and Japan, while in the South China Sea and the East China Sea, four ASEAN countries and Taiwan also claim their sovereignty.

Aggressive and assertive

According to M. Taylor Fravel of the MIT’s security studies program, China's policy in the South China Sea since the 1990s has been to delay the efforts for dispute resolution with the aim to consolidate its claim and prevent other countries from developing projects that do not involve Beijing.

Instead, the strategy was carried through cooperation and escalation, especially because China had limited naval capabilities back then. Since the mid-2000s, this consolidation has been enhanced through diplomatic, administrative and military means.

China will also use diplomacy to prevent any commercial activity in the disputed waters.

Diplomatically, as then-foreign minister Qian Qichen said in 1995, China would go through negotiations to resolve disputes according to international law, but prioritize a bilateral rather than multilateral framework.

China will respond to claims regarding sovereignty and maritime rights, especially when it feels it is being challenged. China will also use diplomacy to prevent any commercial activity in the disputed waters.

Fravel says, “International law demands that states actively maintain their claims, especially when challenged by other states.”

The administrative method used is to increase efforts to assert its jurisdiction through civil maritime law enforcement agencies.

Regarding commercial activities related to the exploration activities of foreign oil and gas companies, China uses the Marine Surveillance Force (under the State Oceanic Administration) in order to secure maritime interests and rights, as was the case with seismic surveys conducted by Vietnam and the Philippines in 2011.

Meanwhile, military instruments have so far played an indirect and secondary role in China's strategy to delay settlement of disputes in the South China Sea.

So far, China has never used force to occupy the disputed features or expulsion from the places it occupies.

Indeed, China often uses its modernized navy for patrolling and training as well as a "show of force" in defending its claims and deterring its rival claimants. So far, China has never used force to occupy the disputed features or expulsion from the places it occupies.

According to Christopher Bishop of the Council on Foreign Relations, China's recent aggressiveness and assertiveness has been driven by the escalation in "provocations" from abroad — ranging from the Covid-19 issue with Australia, the dispute over the Japanese-occupied Senkaku/Diaoyu islands, clashes in Himalayas with India, to the issue of air corridor over the Taiwan Strait (Dian Wirengjurit, Kompas, 20/11/2021).

This marks a shift to China’s new and hard-line foreign policy under President Xi Jinping, from Deng Xiaoping's old “hide your strength, bide your time” approach.

Dokumentasi Setneg

Illustration of President Jokowi with a number of high-ranking TNI officers during Friday prayers some time ago on Natuna Island, Riau Islands Province.

According to Taylor Fravel, Deng's approach is not completely ditched out with some top ranks still subscribing to "sovereignty is ours, set aside disputes, pursue joint development".

What to do?

In the latest development, it is reported that China has started deploying its naval vessels as the country sees drilling as a form of provocation. Indonesia does not need to be provoked by China's maneuvers and protests for several reasons.

First, a country protesting against another country is common in the diplomatic world. A protest conveyed in the form of a diplomatic note is not a threat, but the protesting country’s "concern" regarding its national interests.

Between 2006 and 2007, China sent 18 diplomatic notes to Vietnam, protesting an exploration and development project, involving foreign oil and gas companies, which included Premier Oil (UK), Chevron (US), Veritas (France), Gazprom (Russia) and Idemitsu (Japan).

Second, China has eaten its own words by rebelling against the 1982 UNCLOS on traditional fishing rights and ignoring international arbitration decisions on the Nine-Dash Line.

China realizes its juridically weak position, but stalls to admit for fear of losing “self-image”, while Indonesia is not bound by the rule to discuss it bilaterally because China is not an immediately adjacent neighbor.

Such provocations are also found in other SCS regions, such as the Spratly Islands, Paracels, Scarborough Shoal and even the Yellow Sea.

Third, Indonesia must see the maneuvers of the Chinese Navy around the ZEEI area evidently as a provocation to slow down the construction of drilling projects, while consolidating and strengthening its position. Such provocations are also found in other SCS regions, such as the Spratly Islands, Paracels, Scarborough Shoal and even the Yellow Sea.

Fourth, the Chinese continued construction of island and military bases as well as routine patrols indicates that this issue will become a "daily menu" in the South China Sea region.

Claims over the ZEEI are not as complicated as the territorial disputes between China and the other claimant countries. Apart from historical "rights", the claims carry a number of historical "flaws" in the relationship between China and its neighbors.

It means China’s move to poke into some areas in the ZEEI, instead of expanding its maritime space, will add to the long list of problems and “enemies".

China is seemingly looking to get Indonesia's attention and buy time. In the case of Vietnam, China in 2007 warned (read: threatened) the BP (UK) company about the economic consequences if it did not stop the construction of the oil block. As a result, BP sold its share in 2009 while Chevron reduced its share in the disputed block.

China was reported to have forced the Vietnamese government into paying US$1 billion in compensation. An executive of a foreign oil company was quoted as saying that he "had never seen so much political interference in the offshore oil and gas industry in the South China Sea". (The Diplomat, 22/7/2020)

In a nutshell, China’s protest over the drilling activity in the ZEEI indeed smacks of business interest. China can exert its pressure anywhere, including in Beijing, where there are representatives of the disputing countries, and on any issue, such as the worldwide use of Covid-19 vaccines.

KOMPAS/PANDU WIYOGA

The distribution of illegal fishing locations in the North Natuna Sea.

China is craving a piece of the pie, and this can be reserved diplomatically through negotiations. So far there is no precedent for China using military force against a country at odds with it in the EEZ dispute.

The choice lies with us and our partners. What is certain is that the settlement cannot be sought in the field and must be taken with care and prudence.

Dian Wirengjurit, Geopolitical, Diplomacy and International Relations Analyst

(This article was translated by Musthofid).