Evolution of Political Dynasties and the 2024 Election

Political dynasty elites consolidate and expand into parties with the capital of popularity and political and economic access.

The following article was translated using both Microsoft Azure Open AI and Google Translation AI. The original article can be found in Evolusi Dinasti Politik dan Pemilu 2024

HERYUNANTO

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Political dynasties evolve faster than we think. It didn't take long for the second generation of a political dynasty to enter the circles of power at the center or regional level.

This rapid evolution is transforming the structure and composition of elites and the level of political competition. The weak party system, open political opportunities, and access to power and the economy support the flourishing of political dynasties. The elites of political dynasties have managed to consolidate themselves and expand into many parties with popularity, political and economic access.

For more than a decade now, we have seen political dynasty elites successfully regenerate while the earlier generation's elites are in power. Our democracy has regressed to its lowest point since the reform era. The parties that should be the locus of political competition are not competitive at all.

A party system that is weak and lacking in innovation means parties are encouraged to look for popular figures to survive intense competition. The party is willing to hunt down popular figures only for short-term needs in facing elections.

The weak party system, open political opportunities, and access to power and economy have supported the thriving of political dynasties.

Two debates

Some studies refer to political dynasties as officials elected while their families are in government, whether currently or in the past (Cruz and Mendoza, 2015). Generally, there are two patterns of political dynasties, namely family members occupying the same positions previously held by other family members, or families occupying positions simultaneously while their members are serving (Albert, et al., 2015).

In responding to the discourse on political dynasties, there are two diverging views. There is a group that believes that in a democratic country, everyone has an equal opportunity to run in political competitions. Supporters of this argument take examples from a number of democratic countries such as the US and India, which show that children from the Bush, Kennedy, and Gandhi families are elected through democratic processes.

Another group argues more critically. For this group, political dynasty elites do not undergo a political regeneration process and only enjoy political and economic access from their first-generation family. The entry of political dynasty elites is also considered to not create equal and fair political competition space.

At the global level, particularly in countries in Latin America, there has been a long-standing trend of limiting dynastic politics. Cruz and Mendoza's (2015) study indicates that the level of democratization in Latin American countries has increased after adopting anti-dynastic political policies.

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The oldest rule comes from Costa Rica's constitution in 1949 which prohibits family members of former presidents and vice presidents from running for the highest government positions and also prohibits two levels below from running in legislative elections. Even in the latest constitution, presidential and vice-presidential candidates cannot come from family members (by blood/marriage) of a sitting or former president and vice president.

Most countries in Latin America have adopted tightening/prohibition of political dynasties since the third wave of democratization. Honduras adopted it in 1982, followed by El Salvador (1983), Guatemala (1985), Nicaragua (1987), Brazil (1990), Colombia (1991), and Paraguay (1992).

In Indonesia, in the year 2015, the new government of Joko Widodo proposed a revision to the Law number 8 of 2015 concerning the Election of Governors, Regents, and Mayors (UU Pilkada). In the revision, there is a clause that prohibits family members of political dynasties from running in the elections, unless they have passed a one-term hiatus.

In Article 7 concerning the letter 'r' in the Law, it is stated that the requirements for candidates for regional heads must "not have a conflict of interest with the incumbent", which means not having a blood relationship, marital ties, and/or direct lineage one level up, down, or sideways with the incumbent, namely father, mother, in-law, uncle, aunt, sibling, sibling-in-law, or child-in-law, except for having passed one term of office. The efforts of the government and DPR to create inclusive politics were struck down by the Constitution court (MK). The MK granted the cancellation of the anti-dynasty article and this eventually became the root of political dynasties in Indonesia.

In the revision, there is a clause that prohibits family members of political dynasties from running in local elections, unless they have taken a break after serving one term.

Elite structure

The question is, why can political dynasties survive and develop? Kenawas' findings (2015) show that the strength of informal family networks and the ability to accumulate resources through competition by relying on the family member's status as an incumbent help political dynasties to survive at the regional level.

Even now, the number of political dynasties in Indonesia is growing three times faster than it did in 2010 and 2018 (Kenawas, 2023). Several studies have concluded that the longer someone holds office or is in power, the more likely they are to build a political dynasty (Dal Bo, Dal Bo, and Synder 2009; Coppenolle, 2017).

The increasing number of politicians from dynastic families has created significant changes in the elite structure in Indonesia. The business-political elite that had gained power in the 2000s is now being replaced by dynastic politician elites. Meanwhile, the number of political elites from activist, professional, and academic groups continues to decline. This is due to limited resources, low popularity, and high political costs brought on by the use of open proportional systems in legislative elections.

In the beginning, political dynasties emerged in the region since the tap of democratization was opened in 1998-1999. Local elites who had access to old power were able to quickly consolidate themselves. With strong economic resources and long-established political networks, the political dynasty elites successfully became the "new elites" in the region and then climbed to the central level.

The elite from political dynasties tend to "career" in the same region as the previous generation. This makes it easier to gain public support and votes in elections as they already have loyal supporters.

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One of the most notable cases, for instance, is the Duterte family. Rodrigo Duterte is a former president of the Philippines who built his political career starting from a member of congress, vice mayor and mayor, to eventually becoming president. He once served as a mayor in Davao, the fifth largest city in the Philippines by population.

When he was president, his daughter, Sara, became the mayor in the same place. In 2022, Sara, who was still the mayor, ran for vice president while Duterte was still the president. Sara, who teamed up with Bong Bong, son of Ferdinand Marcos, the dictator who was overthrown in the 1986 people power revolution, won with 58.7 percent of the vote.

Risk

The question is: will President Joko Widodo's decision to "approve" Gibran Rakabuming Raka, the Mayor of Solo who is also his son, have political risks or not? If so, how big is the risk and what are the impacts?

The risk is influenced by three conditions. Firstly, public response to the issue of political dynasties that has emerged, especially after the Constitutional Court's decision which some people consider to be suspicious. If there is an escalation of public dissatisfaction with this issue, it could be bad news for Gibran's public support.

Secondly, there is a risk on the public trust towards the government's performance. The latest survey conducted by the Indonesian Survey Institute (LSI) shows a decrease in the percentage of the public who believe that the economic situation and law enforcement are in good condition. The LSI survey (October 2023) found that the percentage of those who believe that the economy is good decreased from 28.7 percent to 23.3 percent, while respondents who said that the economic situation had worsened increased from 26.4 percent to 32.9 percent.

If there is an escalation of public dissatisfaction regarding this matter, it could possibly be bad news for public support of Gibran.

If there is an escalation of dissatisfaction with the political dynasty, it is not impossible that distrust in the government will also decrease, and this will certainly affect the political legacy of the Jokowi government which has been well maintained since the first term.

Thirdly, there's a risk of facing directly with PDI Perjuangan (PDI-P). As a member and a president who have been supported since his time as the Mayor of Solo, the Governor of Jakarta, and two terms as president, Jokowi's choice to face PDI-P directly is not politically advantageous.

The strengthening of the role played by political dynasty elites will certainly pose a challenge for the future development of Indonesian democracy, especially in providing equal competition space and the potential for increasing political corruption (Rahman, 2013). At a global level, initiatives to limit political dynasties have long been in place and are a trend, especially in countries in Latin America.

Although the perception of dynasty politics is often negative, throughout history some dynasties have contributed to the development of democracy and development, such as the Kennedy and Rockefeller families in the US.

Also read: The Erasure of Democratic Values ​​is Called a Political Dynasty

ARSIP CSIS

Arya Fernandes

Arya FernandesChair of the Department of Politics and Social Change, CSIS