Armed Group and Papua Developmentalism

The armed violence perpetrated by armed criminal groups (KKBs) in Papua is becoming increasingly concerning. The number of casualties continue to rise, from both the Indonesian Military (TNI) and the National Police (Polri), as well as civilians.

In the last 4.5 years (2017-2022), according to data compiled from various media reports, more than 200 shooting incidents by KKBs have occurred with no less than 144 deaths, including 11 fatalities during the latest incident on 16 July in Nduga regency. These figures do not include the hundreds of living survivors.

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The inhumane and brutal act by a group of Papuans labeled as KKB, of course, should no longer be underestimated or be considered as a group of citizens merely committing criminal acts, but must be positioned as a separatist movement that still exists and is trying to continue the mission of the Free Papua Movement (OPM). It has sent a strong signal that it has enough members so that this movement of defiance or resistance against the existence of the Indonesian government in Papua is difficult to eradicate.

Effectiveness of development

A critical question that needs to be asked is: Why does a separatist movement (whose actions are labeled as KKB) still exist, even though the people of Papua (formerly West Irian) have been part of the Indonesian motherland for 59 years (1963-2022)?

Meanwhile, Jakarta has a very strong commitment to the “Land of Cenderawasih”. Papua has been and continues to be treated affirmatively, among others, through the disbursement of development funds that are generally very large compared to the portion of other regions outside Java. Likewise, the regional heads are native Papuans, as regulated by Law No 21/2001 on Special Autonomy (Otsus) for Papua. During the 21 years that the Special Autonomy Law has been in effect, the funds disbursed to Papua have totaled around Rp 150 trillion. This is a pretty fantastic amount.

In addition, the government has made progressive steps this year by establishing three provinces or new autonomous regions (DOB) in Papua, namely the provinces of South Papua, Central Papua and the Papua Highlands. Papua is receiving special treatment in the midst of new proposals (for the creation of DOBs) from other regions that are piling up at the Home Ministry and House of Representatives (DPR) Commission II, which have still not been verified until now.

The policy to form the DOBs is, of course, aimed at further optimizing public services for the Papuan people by expanding economic growth centers and shortening the span of control, which will in the end improve the welfare of the Papuan people.

And because the KKB actors are also part of the local population, surely their existence is also part of the extended family of indigenous Papuans people who already know each other, and even live in a strong system of kinship.

However, it seems that the development strategy approach (through special policies) oriented towards public welfare has been unable to effectively satisfy all its citizens in terms of "being happy and recognizing" that they are part of the framework of the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia (NKRI); at least, not those who are in the “resistance” group dubbed as a KKB. And because the KKB actors are also part of the local population, surely their existence is also part of the extended family of indigenous Papuans people who already know each other, and even live in a strong system of kinship.

If the theory described above can be accepted as part of fact, the cultural-emotional relations between KKB actors and local residents (figures) contains at least three key phenomena.

First, Papuan leaders (traditional leaders, religious leaders, tribal leaders, and local officials) do not have a plan to influence or lead KKB actors to comply with government policies or regulations, while they enjoy the benefits of the existing development programs and their outcomes. In fact, it is possible that the process of recruiting members of the "resistance group" is not given special attention or approached through persuasive efforts at prevention to then ask them to join the common group as citizens of the Republic of Indonesia.

Perhaps they grew too busy with the agenda of running and enjoying the various development programs, as well as enjoying their current political positions, thus neglecting their substantial duties as a local sociopolitical integrator.

It seems these local figures and officials consider handling the “separatist movement” the exclusive responsibility of the TNI and Polri. In fact, if it is recognized that the dissident groups are part of the local population, it is the local stakeholders who can be more effective in persuading them, not powers from outside the region.

Second, in relation to the first point, the relationship between the central government and Papua’s regional administrations is limited to only the development agenda or strategy, the success of which is measured by the realization of the budget that is physically disbursed in the for of development. As a result, Papuan stakeholders are only busy fulfilling the government’s administrative and development obligations, without any special obligation to eradicate KKBs as a resistance movement.

And an inclusive strategy like this is actually what is needed in promoting development policies in Papua.

If the measure of the success of development in each Papuan region is also determined by the absence of KKB actors, perhaps regional heads and their entire staff would continue to detect, identify and invite KKB actors to join their brothers and sisters in the home called Indonesia. And an inclusive strategy like this is actually what is needed in promoting development policies in Papua.

Don't stand alone

Third, the central government will always find it difficult to stop KKB actors as long as they obscure the substance of the KKBs’ political position or stance.

The KKB actors must first be recognized as “a resistance group of Papuan people” (read: splinter group) whose aspirations have been ignored or who are simply pretending to be an ordinary criminal group. In fact, KKBs do not stand alone, but has a local base and an external network or support (including indigenous Papuans who live and are fighting for their aspirations from overseas).

The problem is that, until now, the authorities have completely closed themselves off from dialogue with the main actors of the resistance (splinter) group or dissidents violating the laws of the Republic of Indonesia, both in the “Land of Cenderawasih” and abroad.

This is different from the peace settlement process in Aceh, which directly involved the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) until the agreement was signed at the Helsinki meeting in 2005. Thus, it is not impossible that the dissident groups in Papua feel “differentiated” from the peacemaking process in Aceh.

What must be realized now is that if resolving the problem of resistance groups (KKBs) in Papua prioritizes using a security approach or military force in the spirit of "enforcing criminal laws", it can potentially raise sensitive issues, namely that of ethnic cleansing. And if that happens, we must be collectively prepared to face solidarity based on race (Melanesia) on the international stage. Therefore, once again, dialogue is the approach that the Indonesian government must consider.

KOMPAS/SHARON PATRICIA

Anggota Ombudsman Laode Ida

Laode Ida,DPD Deputy Chairman (2004-2014), Indonesia Ombudsman commissioner (2016-2021)

(This article was translated by Kurniawan Siswo)