Papua and the Alienated Government

The situation in Papua is growing bleaker with rising violence and conflicts that are increasingly difficult to overcome.

Dozens of people have been victims among civilians, armed criminal groups (KKB)/West Papua National Liberation Army (TPNPB), as well as the security forces. The KKB/TPNPB are increasingly brutal in attacking public facilities, such as the airport in Ilaga, and have been accused of burning down a dormitory for teachers in Puncak regency. The condition in Papua is now at a critical level.

There is no longer a policy that can “win over” the Papuan people, so instability and social unrest continue to be real threats. The second edition of special autonomy (Otsus) that the government implemented as a panacea for dealing with complex issues in Papua has now lost its appeal. The plan to form a new autonomous region (DOB) has also received strong resistance from the Papuan people and the Papuan elite.

This article reviews the various governance problems in Papua.

Alienation

The complexity of the Papua situation requires the government to review the policies that have been implemented so far. Borrowing the concept of critical theory, various forms of alienation have occurred with regard to Papua.

First, the government appears to be experiencing isolation from stakeholders in implementing its policies because of “minimal” support, especially from the Papuan elite and indigenous Papuans (OAPs). In this context, the weak solidity between the central government and local administrations is evident, for example, from the lack of empathetic statements from local administrations regarding the various acts of violence, particularly those perpetrated by the TPNPB and security forces.

Second, the central government has experienced policy “alienation” at the implementation level. Alienation implies a “loss of control” and, as it turned out, Otsus edition I has failed to produce the expected outcome. The government has even lost control from deviations in its implementation, so it is seen as having “allowed” this to happen.

Also read:

> Papua and Neglect on the Conflict-Development Nexus

> Accuracy in Legal and Policy Orientation in Papua

The DOB plan has also led to a form of alienation because it is opposed by various community groups, especially the Papuan elite that feel they will be disadvantaged. However, the DOB plan can also be seen as the central government’s effort to fight alienation and win back “loyalty” of the local Papuan elite according to their economic or political interests.

Third, external alienation has also been interpreted as the government's powerlessness against acts of violence committed by the KKB/TPNPB. The government's security strategy has become alienated because it does not have the support of local actors in Papua. Internally, there has often been overlap or contradiction in interministerial programs, as well as lack of coordination that has weakened the synergy between actors in dealing with Papuan issues.

Fourth, the local administration, the cultural representatives of the Papuan people in the Papuan People's Assembly (MRP) and OAPs have also experienced alienation of their rights and obligations. Both Otsus I and II defines the authority of the local administration, the Papuan House of Representatives (DPRP), and the MRP as being tasked with managing governance and development in Papua. In reality, their rights and obligations have been “castrated”.

The saying “the head is removed, but the tail is still attached” illustrates the obstacles the local administration and the MRP have had in implementing the Otsus articles that fall within their authority. Various policies that “bypass” the roles of the DPRP and the MRP, such as the expansion and cancellation of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, as well as the formation of local political parties, are examples of this alienation. Moreover, some OAPs have been alienated from the process and outcomes of development. In essence, they are all powerless to face central policies that have been applied “unilaterally”.

Root of the problem

It is not too difficult to identify the source of alienation in the context of Papua. There is a historical product that underlies the long history of turmoil in Papua that is caused by problems of recognition and representation. Recognition and representation are important elements of dialogue. OAPs have experienced what Taylor (1994)[2] calls misrecognition or nonrecognition in various discourses and efforts to search for solutions related to Papua.

The absence of recognition is a form of oppression, “imprisoning one's existence” by manipulation, deviation, and denial of the rights to human existence. There are various reasons why there is “nonrecognition” of OAPs. First, OAPs’ physical differences when compared to other Indonesians is usually marked by different skin color and hair type. Because OAPs are considered the “other”, as a result, violence and discrimination are reproduced through cultural differences.

Second, the sociocultural construct places OAPs in a backward, ignorant, and uncivilized level of society, so they are considered “unworthy” to be invited to dialogues on par with other levels of society because they are incompetent.

Third, in connection to the second reason, there is a sociopolitical construct that wants to place OAPs as an inferior social group, which leads to racism.

Also read:

> Reducing Armed Conflicts in Papua

> Long Road to Settling Papua Issue

A Papuan youth once expressed his opinion on racism, which he says was built on strong economic and political motivations. This tool is intended to create a sense of inferiority and eliminate self-confidence so that Papuans do not “revolt” when “external powers” exploit the province. Racism is constructed to avoid competition or competition and is usually followed by a lack of recognition for OAPs’ capacities.

Moreover, representation is also a serious problem in Papua. There are two dimensions of representation. First, OAPs are considered incapable of self-representation. Referring to Spivak (2010)[3], they are considered a subaltern group or part of marginalized society who should not form plans or actions that can bring recognition to strengthen their identity.

OAPs are considered unable to determine their development needs, so that “outsiders” need to represent OAPs’ interests. The impact is fatal, because they are not in line with the needs of OAPs. As a result, the narrative of Papuan development is met with cynicism and skepticism, including the plan to divide Papua, which is often questioned as to whose interests it is for.

This representation process has increasingly alienated OAPs in their own homeland. Even though it involves marginalized community groups, the subaltern position is not static. There is a transformative process of forming an alliance among OAPs or Papuan elites to “fight” the hegemony of power that has been marginalizing them. This can be seen from the resistance of various parties in Papua against government policies.

Second, representation is often used as a polemic in finding a Papuan solution. OAPs consider that they have never been invited to a dialogue, while the central government defends itself that it has invited representatives from Papua.

Also read:

> Papua Development Paradigm

Meanwhile, finding people who can represent OAPs' interests is a complicated matter because the fragmentation of local interests often intersects with diverse tribal and ethnic lines. The government needs to wisely accommodate various kinds of “representation” from OAPs, even if doing so involves more frequent and longer meetings in order to uphold a sense of justice.

Future projection

From this description, what are the projections for the future of Papua? First, the government should not be complacent and rely only on the issue of Papuan sovereignty, which is recognized by other countries based on the history of Papuan integration, which is still debated. Because “foreign intervention”, especially from the United Nations, is very likely to occur, especially with the increasing prevalence of violence and human rights violations.

Second, if the central and regional governments exercise their “authority” in a disorganized manner, the potential for diametrical conflicts can occur and exacerbate mutual distrust, such as when the Papuan regional administration invited representatives from Russia to build the Central Space Agency in Papua. This action was deemed as overstepping the central government’s duties in lobbying other countries.

From the complexity of these problems, the alienation of governance can be overcome only if there is improvement in the efforts to build aspects of recognition and representation in a fundamental and serious manner, and involving all elements of society in Papua. Recognition and representation is essentially respecting the voice of OAPs and placing them on an equal footing. The government needs to open the widest possible public space for every element of OAPs and the local elite, including facilitating dialogue to contest controversial policies. This effort is expected to help improve the condition in Papua, which is growing increasingly critical and alienated in multiple dimensions.

Vidhyandika D. Perkasa, Senior Researcher at the Department of Politics and Social Change, Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Jakarta

This article was translated by Hyginus Hardoyo.