Coalition Models for 2024
In contrast to 2019, the 2024 election will be marked by two things. First, there is no incumbent. Second, the results of public opinion research indicate the possibility of a highly competitive presidential election.
From the 2004 elections to the 2019 elections, coalitions in presidential elections in Indonesia saw one pattern: the presidential candidate was picked first, then the coalition was built.
The ideologies and programs of the parties (except religious issues) tend to be fluid, therefore the binding factor between parties to make a stronger coalition is the presidential candidate figure. In addition, the votes gained for each party also tended to be fragmented (there is no party with a dominant vote gain) so it is necessary to look for an acceptable figure who can bind the coalition.
The 2019 (legislative and presidential) elections, which were held concurrently, actually provided an opportunity for the formation of a political coalition with a second pattern: the political parties formed a coalition first, then the presidential candidate was determined later. However, because there were dominant figures for presidential candidates (Joko Widodo and Prabowo Subianto), the 2019 coalition more closely reflects the first pattern. Parties congregate on the basis of their ties to the presidential candidate.
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In contrast to 2019, the 2024 election will be marked by two things. First, there is no incumbent for the presidential election. Second, the results of public opinion research from a number of credible institutions indicate the possibility of a highly competitive presidential election. Until June 2021, a dominant candidate has yet to be seen. There is not even a candidate who has an electability of 30 percent or more in the semi-open simulation or many candidates in the various surveys. So, there is no figure for a presidential candidate who can be accepted widely so far.
On the other hand, parties, especially those in the House of Representatives (DPR), can form coalitions based on the percentage of votes or seats they gain. So, it is very possible to form a coalition using the second pattern.
Three coalition models
Because the two patterns of coalition formation may occur in the 2024 General Election, there can be three coalition models. The models I will discuss below are examples of possible applications of the two patterns. Of course we can create other models. In the first model, political parties already secured requirements as well as candidates for president and vice president. This model seems to be developed by the PDI-P and Gerindra.
In terms of requirements, these two parties control a total of 206 seats in the House (35.8 percent). Both also have historical reasons and personal-organizational affinities for building a coalition. Megawati and Prabowo have run as presidential and vice presidential candidates (2009), both are also close personally, and there is a history of "Batu Tulis Agreement" that brought them closer. There will also be presidential and vice presidential candidates, Prabowo and Puan Maharani. However, considering that Prabowo\'s electability is still not dominant even though he tends to be superior, the continuity of the formation of this coalition will still depend on the dynamics of his electability.
The second model is that a number of parties make an agreement in a coalition and then jointly look for presidential and vice presidential candidates. If the PDI-P and Gerindra coalition is formed, mathematically it is still possible to form three more coalitions (e.g. Golkar-PAN, PKB-Nasdem and the Democratic Party (PD)-PKS-PPP). Of course, this mathematical possibility is politically difficult to realize.
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More logically politically, parties outside the PDI-P and Gerindra could form two more coalitions.
Forming coalitions can be because they are relatively close to each other (such as PDI-P and Gerindra), or because they are both relatively far away from potential opponents. For example, of these seven parties, there are three parties that have never formed a coalition with the PDI-P in the presidential election since 2004, namely PAN, PD, and PKS. So this could happen again in 2024. PDI-P has already given a signal that it is difficult for the party to form a coalition with PD and PKS.
The PD has always had obstacles to get closer to the PDI-P, partly because of the unfavorable relationship between Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and Megawati. PKS tends to have the greatest distance from the PDI-P in matters concerning the relationship between Islam and the state. So, it is possible that the PAN-PD-PKS coalition was formed. Apart from historical similarities, these three parties also do not have their own candidates. There is Agus Harimurti Yudhoyono (AHY) from PD, but for the time being his electability is still not competitive as a presidential candidate.
The other four parties, namely Golkar, PKB, Nasdem, and PPP, had no significant obstacles to forming another coalition. The four also do not have their own presidential candidates, although there are aspirations in Golkar and PKB to prioritize their respective chairperson. So, there is no obstacle for them to jointly look for the presidential and vice-presidential candidates.
Of course, like other parties, the four had other options, for example joining the PDI-P-Gerindra, or with the PAN-PD-PKS axis, or other options. These four parties have no barriers to joining the PAN-PD-PKS axis. Joining the PDI-P-Gerindra also had no significant obstacles, except for Nasdem. The chairman of Nasdem may find it a bit difficult to form a coalition with Gerindra given the rivalry with Prabowo since they were both in Golkar.
Those three coalition models are similar to the previous presidential election, since 2004. Parties build the widest possible political relationship, both between parties and with potential figures for the presidential and vice presidential candidates while waiting for their electability to develop. When the electability dynamics has narrowed down to two or three names, the parties will begin to narrow their coalition choices based on the choices of those potential names.
The coalitions in the first and second models will reduce uncertainty more and can make parties and the presidential and vice-presidential candidates more focused on their work. The second and third model coalitions need more time to form. The level of uncertainty in the third model is the highest, it is very possible to overtake each other on the road and elbow each other in corners.
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The choice, of course, rests with the party because the presidential election in Indonesia, especially the nomination, is very dependent on the party. The constitution does not allow for an independent candidate.
Joint convention
What is interesting, if the parties decide to form a coalition first (the second pattern), how will they determine the presidential and vice presidential candidates. There must be many choices, but one of the interesting and good options is to have a convention together.
There are also many technical options for implementation. Conventions can be carried out openly by providing opportunities for all figures/parties, whether from parties or not, to participate in the competition. It can also be semi-open by providing opportunities for party cadres and figures specifically invited by the party coalition to join the convention.
The other option is carried out behind closed doors, followed only by party cadres in the coalition. In essence, there are many choices, including who has the right to vote in the convention process.
There are many advantages from organizing conventions together. First, because the coalition of parties is clear, there is certainty about the fate of the convention winners that they will be nominated later. The convention that had been implemented in the past several presidential elections had this problem of certainty. The winner of the convention was not necessarily a candidate because it still depended on the process of forming a party coalition.
Second, joint conventions also mean coordination between coalition member parties, down to the grassroots level. This will not only help consolidate their respective parties ahead of the election, but also allow coalition members to see various possible common strategies in participating in legislative elections. This is important because the presidential and legislative elections are held simultaneously.
Coordination and joint strategy are needed so that the coattail effect can help all coalition parties. Our analysis of the 2019 general election shows that only three parties in the Jokowi-Amin coalition have had a positive coattail effect, namely PDI-P, PKB, and Nasdem.
Other coalition member parties did not get a significant positive effect, even two parties (PPP and PBB) had a negative effect. Coordination and shared strategies in legislative elections among coalition members can help make the coattail effect more evenly distributed in its positive impact.
Third, joint conventions can be a good medium or way to communicate the process carried out by parties in determining candidates for national leaders to the public. If carried out openly, the convention also provides an opportunity for the aspirations of the people who want figures outside the party to be tested for their potential to become national leaders together with figures from within the party. Conventions provide greater scope for transparency of the political process.
Djayadi Hanan
Back to the pattern of coalition formation, the second pattern can provide a way for political parties to strengthen the party system so that it does not always depend on the personal figures of presidential candidates. This second pattern can also be a way to form a longer coalition pattern. If this happens, even though there are still a large number of our parties in parliament, the coalition pattern can be simpler.
Djayadi Hanan, Lecturer of Political Science at Paramadina University; Executive Director of the Indonesian Survey Institute (LSI)
This article was translated by Kurniawan Siswoko.
