The Hydra Monster’s Cycle of Vendetta

KOMPAS/RIZA FATHONI

Police officers check a vehicle on Wednesday (13/11/2019) at the entrance to Jakarta Police headquarters. All police stations in Jakarta have tightened security checks on vehicles, including police vehicles, following the suicide attack on Medan Police Station early that morning, with vehicle checks.

If the bomb attack at the Medan Police headquarters in North Sumatra on Wednesday (13/11/2019) was truly a terror attack that specifically targeted the police, this means that the police have been a target of terrorists in Indonesia for nine years. There are several factors, both local and global, behind this trend of attacks.

In terror attacks, the type of target is among the most dynamic factors. Target type is influenced by the dynamics of doctrines and legitimacy of terror networks.

The police have been consistently targeted since 2010, namely after the police’s counterterrorism squad uncovered a paramilitary training camp in Aceh Besar. On March 15, 2010, First Brig. Yona Anton was shot dead at the Prembun police subprecinct in Kebumen, Central Java. The perpetrator was the Yuli Harsono group, in retaliation to the camp raid in Aceh.

Attacks on police personnel, both in and out of police offices, have continued up to Wednesday. Previously, in 2002-2010, terror attacks in Indonesia targeted far off enemies, namely the United States and its allies. This is in line with the calls of Al Qaeda, a major global terror group at the time.

Going further back, local terror groups in Indonesia had prioritized near enemies. Before collaborating with Al Qaeda, a regional terror group that once had its grip on Indonesia, Jamaah Islamiyah (JI), orientated its “jihadist” movement against a near enemy, namely the Indonesian government. Other than the state, churches were perceived as another common near enemy.

KOMPAS/AUFRIDA WISMI WARASTRI

Policemen on Wednesday (13/11/2019) seal a rented house on Gg. Melati in Tanah Enamratus village in Medan Marelan, North Sumatra, where the alleged perpetrator of the suicide attack on Medan Police Station had lived with his wife for the past month.

In 2000, a bomb was set off at the Indonesian Protestantism Christian Church in Padangbulan, Medan. It is believed that this was the first of a series of JI bombings in Indonesia.

JI was an organization that involved former Darul Islam (DI) activists, including its cofounder Abdullah Sungkar. The sending of JI members to Afghanistan in the 1980s aimed to prepare JI members for opportunities to topple the New Order regime, deemed to be secular instead of upholding Islamic law. This history can be read in the book NII Sampai JI, Salafy Jihadisme di Indonesia (NII to JI, Jihadist Salafy in Indonesia) by Sholahuddin.

The change from targeting far off enemies to near enemies triggered prolonged debates in terror groups. Some JI members followed Osama bin Laden’s 1998 fatwa to see the West as the enemy, while others preferred near targets such as the government.

“Thaghut” doctrine

The dynamics of a doctrine in deciding enemies is influenced by local and global developments. The attacks on police personnel are inseparable from the issuance of the thaghut (tyrannical infidels) doctrine.

The doctrine had been a mainstay among figures in Indonesian terror networks since 2010. When the government and police personnel are labeled as thaghut, it becomes valid to attack them. The thaghut doctrine mainly targets members of the police’s Densus 88 counterterrorism squad.

In the era of the Islamic State (IS) movement, which campaigns for global insurgency, calls to attack local governments have strengthened the doctrine that governments that do not uphold Islamic sharia are thaghut.

Global factors that have affected the rise of thaghut labeling against near enemies include the weakening of the JI and Al Qaeda terror groups, especially after the death of Osama bin Laden in 2011. In the era of the Islamic State (IS) movement, which campaigns for global insurgency, calls to attack local governments have strengthened the doctrine that governments that do not uphold Islamic sharia are thaghut.

In Indonesia, proponents of the thaghut doctrine include Abu Bakar Ba’asyir and Aman Abdurrahman. Ba’asyir, for instance, states the doctrine in his books, including Surat kepada Penguasa (A Letter to the Ruler, 2008), Demokrasi adalah Bisikan Setan, Seruan Tauhid di Bawah Ancaman Mati (Democracy is the Whispers of Satan, Calls for Tawhid under Threats of Death, 2011) and Buku II Ta-dzkiroh (2012).

The book Calls for Tawhid under Threats of Death, for instance, contains the passage: “then all officials governing the state of Indonesia are thaghut so long as they reject to govern the state with the laws of Allah”. Ba’asyir concluded that whoever defends, supports and preserves democracy (as a religion) is thaghut. Therefore, all personnel who support democracy, including police personnel, are thaghut.

The thaghut concept is derived from Abu Muhammad Al Maqdisi. The Jordanian figure serves as an exemplar for Indonesian terror and extremist groups. Aman Abdurrahman translated Al Maqdisi’s writing Agama Demokrasi Menghantam Islam (The Religion of Democracy Hits Islam).

It contains this passage: “thaghut is the devil taking the form of men who refers to the devil’s laws while he has control over them. This simplification is supported by Ibnu Taimiyyah’s statement that whoever makes laws not in line with Islamic law is thaghut”.

This thaghut doctrine is what Mark Juergensmeyer calls the demonization of others for the sake of creating enemies. In the book Terror in the Mind of God: The Global Rises of Religious Violence (2003), it is said that battles and wars will never occur without the presence of enemies. Enemies will have to be created if they do not yet exist.

If the persecution does not exist, legitimacy for terror is weak and creativity will be required in the demonization.

Juergensmeyer explains that demonizing others will be easy if there are those who feel persecuted or harmed by vicious powers. If the persecution does not exist, legitimacy for terror is weak and creativity will be required in the demonization.

Referring to Juergensmeyer’s ideas, the government and law enforcement must be careful in taking strategic steps to counter radicalism and extremism. They must not be triggered in a way that turns their moves into a justification for more fatal terror attacks.

The state and radical-extremist groups are scrambling for public legitimacy in order to ensure the achievement of their respective goals. Radical extremists are like a many-headed hydra monster that can regrow its heads when one is cut off. If this is so, the cycle of terrorism vendettas in this country will never end.