Cabinet’s Initial Challenges

Like the tagline of a candy ad: The taste is unruly. Hopes and anxieties become one after hearing the announcement of the names of ministers and deputy ministers of the Indonesian Onward Cabinet.

The mixed feelings are not only related to the personnel being chosen, but also to the policy choices that will be made as the development “commander”.

The red thread of the mixed feelings originates from the impression of existence of strong smell of transactional politics (read: seat sharing) in the process of forming the Indonesia Onward Cabinet (KIM). The appointment of a deputy minister from an element of a voluntary organization that had previously been \'sulking\' became its caricature marker. Also, the entrance of Gerindra also needs to be placed in this context.

And, therefore, it is not worth glorifying as a form of the statesmanship of Prabowo or Jokowi, for example.

What needs to be placed in its context, “the seat sharing” (cabinet) is the output of the bargaining process in forming a coalition cabinet. In a multiparty presidential system, a coalition cabinet is inevitable unless the parties supporting the president hold majority seats in the legislature and or are willing to set an ad hoc strategy (temporary coalition) in the legislature (Martinez-Gallardo, 2011).

In the case of the 2019 presidential election, the coalition cabinet was a necessity because the electoral system encouraged the formation of the coalition before the election was held. The consequence of continuing to apply the presidential threshold (even using the vote base of the previous election) is forcing a candidate to negotiate power with the parties to be able to meet the prerequisite of the threshold for support.

The red thread of the mixed feelings originates from the impression of existence of strong smell of transactional politics (read: seat sharing) in the process of forming the Indonesia Onward Cabinet (KIM).

Bargaining in forming a coalition cabinet becomes something that can be considered normal if what is put forward is the issue of policy (policy seeker) and not about the number of seats or positions in the cabinet (office seeker).

As stated by Cheibub et al (2004), the politics of bargaining needs to be distinguished between as the last objective and as a method. In the case of the formation of KIM, which has appeared to the surface so far, is more seen as seeking public office as is clearly seen in the case of the \'sulking\' volunteer organizations and also in the large number of deputy ministers being promoted when on another occasion Jokowi spoke about the need to streamline bureaucracy.

KOMPAS/WAWAN H PRABOWO

President Joko Widodo (fourth left) and Vice President Ma\'ruf Amin (fifth left) pose for a photograph with deputy minister candidates in the Indonesia Onward Cabinet before attending the inauguration ceremony at Merdeka Palace in Jakarta, Friday (25/10/2019). A total of 12 deputy ministers for 11 ministries were sworn on Friday.

In this context, on the other hand, the choice to involve Gerindra in KIM tends to be understandable although it does not always have to be politically justified. Without Gerindra, KIM has only reached the level of what is called the coalition victory threshold (minimum winning coalition). Theoretically, this threshold allows small parties to \'take hostages\' of the President (Raile et al, 2009). In the KIM case, the threat does not come from a small party like the United Development Party (PPP), but a middle party like the National Awakening Party (PKB) or Nasdem, for example. Thus, the presence of Gerindra can be understood as a necessary backup strategy. However, this choice of course also has other political consequences.

External challenges

In brief, the process of forming KIM cannot simply be accepted even though it also did not receive strong rejection. This cannot be separated from the political capital owned by Jokowi. Referring to the latest Kompas R&D survey, 73.3 percent rated his image to be good. At the start of taking the power, those who stated that his image was good reached 89.9 percent. Even though it is high, Jokowi needs to pay close attention to a consistent downward trend that has occurred over the last 1.5 years. In terms of performance, the Kompas survey also showed a downward trend in the level of satisfaction, from 72 percent in April 2018 to 59 percent in October 2019 (Kompas, 18/10/2019).

This is important to build confidence that what is being handled is a radical movement that promotes violent ways and/or aims to change the basis of the state.

Therefore, externally, there are a number of challenges or homework that need to be completed and or shown by KIM in the first 100 days. It read thread is: restoring trust and/or awakening hope. First, addressing the anxiety of the supporters themselves. The inclusion of Prabowo and the \'disappearance\' of traditions which usually placed NU in the position of minister of religion and Muhammadiyah in the minister of education has triggered the pros and cons among a part of Jokowi supporters. Previously, a part of the supporters of Jokowi (especially activists) had experienced anxiety, when Jokowi did not show signs of issuing a Perppu (regulation in lieu of the law) to annul the revision of the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) Law, not to mention the controversy over the draft Criminal Code Bill that would be determined in the near future. At this point, the intension to maintain the incumbent coordinating Politics, Law and Human right minister is like a slap in their faces.

The second challenge is related to radicalism. KIM needs to explain its handling strategy holistically. And, this needs to start by building a typology of radicalism and handling approaches according to the typology. This is important to build confidence that what is being handled is a radical movement that promotes violent ways and/or aims to change the basis of the state, not to suppress religious expressions (bearded, veiled, cropped trousers, etc.) that have the potential to increasingly divide the society horizontally.

KOMPAS/HARIS FIRDAUS

A man signs on a banner during the "Declaration of Peace in Jogja Refusing Violence, Intolerance and Radicalism" on Wednesday (14/2/2018), at the Office of the Yogyakarta governor, Yogyakarta city. The declaration was held after an attack on the Santa Lidwina Church, Sleman regency, Yogyakarta, Sunday (11/2).

In line with that, the third challenge is how to explain the policy formulas that make investment the commander of development. At least it deals with the following three policy issues: (a) the potential for the weakening of freedom, legal annihilation, and neglect of human rights; (b) the possibility of sacrificing the need for social policy financing (eg health funds) or the need to use public funds more carefully (for example pilgrimage funds); and; (c) giving confidence that the flow of foreign investment funds remains in the corridor of national interests. In this sense, the protection of local products and industries is prioritized.

Fourth, KIM has the main obligation to emphasize its position and commitment related to a number of policy issues that are inherited from the previous cabinet. Several of them include: the sustainability of the Social Security Management Agency (BPJS), the strengthening of the KPK institution, the follow-up of the pending bills, as well as its attitude towards some problematic bills [for example, the Electronic Information and Transactions (ITE) Law] and crucial but marginalized bills (for example the Personal Data Protection Bill).

Internally, the main challenge being faced by Jokowi as the main captain of KIM is managing the coalition.

Fifth, KIM needs to explain its policy formulation to answer the possibility of recession/slowing economic growth at the global level through the elaboration of strategies from all related ministries.

This is needed to build trust for the investors, market participants, and the public who tend to respond positively to the retention of Sri Mulyani Indrawati, but ask questions about the emergence of party cadres who lead several other economic ministries.

Internal challenges

Internally, the main challenge being faced by Jokowi as the main captain of KIM is managing the coalition. In this case, ensuring the stability of KIM as far as possible, but still paying attention to performance. Related to this, there are at least four challenges that need to be managed carefully.

KOMPAS/RADITYA HELABUMI

Defense Minister Prabowo Subianto (right) and defense minister for the 2014-2019 term, Ryamizard Ryacudu (left), shake hands at a ceremony for the handover of the position at the Defense Ministry, Jakarta, Thursday (24/10/2019).

First, fair treatment. Political parties who feel they are not treated fairly have the chance to leave the cabinet at any time (Altman, 2000) or at least ignore the discipline of the coalition at the legislative level. From the process of its formation, the seeds of dissatisfaction have appeared in KIM\'s body. Nasdem, for example, indirectly sent a signal of "unhappiness" during the cabinet formation process. Moreover, what also needs to be underlined is the dissatisfaction Nahdlatul Ulama and more implicitly the Muhammadiyah\'s rage regarding the ministry\'s position, which has always been filled by the cadres from the two mass organizations.

Second, the solidity of the coalition cabinet is also influenced by the size of the coalition. The bigger the coalition, the easier it is not to become solid. This inconsistency will be even more potential if the ideological distance among the parties is also quite varied and or at least there are differences in choices related to one or several policy issues. The inclusion of Gerindra makes the Jokowi-Ma\'ruf Amin coalition become (added) fat. This is further imbued with non-chair political parties in the legislature.

The size of the party makes the allocation of power distribution more difficult and or expensive. Therefore, it is increasingly possible for the parties to feel treated unfairly. The situation will increasingly be worse if internally there appears camp formation, such as the emergence of the term \'Teuku Umar camp\' and \'Gondangdia camp\', which has been widely discussed some time ago.

The size of the party makes the allocation of power distribution more difficult and or expensive.

Third, the solidity of the coalition cabinet is also influenced by factionalization within the coalition parties. Factionalization is important to watch because it can affect the discipline of coalition in the legislature. In the context of KIM, the potential for disruption from factionalization mainly originates from parties with strong factionalization such as Golkar and to a lesser degree in PKB and PPP.

KOMPAS/WAWAN H PRABOWO

President Joko Widodo and Vice President Ma\'ruf Amin pose for a photograph with ministers on the front steps of Merdeka Palace, Jakarta, Wednesday (23/10/2019). On that day, President Joko Widodo announced the composition of his Cabinet, which was named the Indonesia Onward Cabinet. On that occasion, the President advised his ministers not to commit corruption and create a system that closed loopholes in corruption.

Fourth, the solidity of the coalition cabinet is also influenced by the closeness of time with the election. And, in the context of the second period, the situation becomes worse. Because, the parties will more critical to evaluate their presence in the coalition. If the political cost is considered to be greater than the political and economic benefits, the parties are very likely to become \'bad boys\' to maintain their voter base or even choose to get out of the coalition.

Being faced with these challenges, Jokowi needs to prepare a relevant anticipation strategy. The most basic thing which needs to be completed in the first 100 days is to build a formal coalition agreement. His message at the inaugural cabinet meeting (there is only the vision of the president-vice president and cabinet work is a teamwork) is still symbolic. The political message needs to be reprocessed into a set of rules, performance indicators and its political consequences. This performance indicator is related to the achievement targets of each ministry, both in the form of priority programs and regular programs.

The key issue is to avoid the possibility of \'twin suns\' in the ministry and/or the possibility of isolation of one of them (whether ministers or vice-ministers).

This indicator must be published from the beginning so that the public can monitor. This transparency is also useful for eliminating the potential of \'political drama\' that is not funny as if a minister were \'victimized\' when he is replaced halfway due to failure to reach performance targets, for example.

Moreover, the coalition agreement also needs to regulate conflict resolution mechanisms that might occur at the level of coalition parties. This conflict can occur due to differences in certain policy issues. However, the parties have certain limits to not be too far from the preferences of their traditional voters. It is too expensive politically if gaps in one or two specific policy issues cause the cabinet have to be divided and or have to be overhauled. However, the President also does not need to hesitate to use the cabinet reshuffle if the minister does not show performance and even reshape the coalition if the solidity is so bad or even becomes a political burden.

No less important is the fact that the rules of the game in the internal cabinet need to be formalized and even known to the public. Learning from the experience of the previous cabinet, there needs to be governance among the coordinating ministries, between the coordinating ministers and the technical ministries under their command, and also between the ministers and the deputy ministers. In the first two things being mentioned, the key issues are synergy and collaboration because the tendency of sectoral ego is still high and/or the feeling that they have stronger political back up. For the latter, the key issue is to avoid the possibility of \'twin suns\' in the ministry and/or the possibility of isolation of one of them (whether ministers or vice-ministers).

Read more : Restoring Trust

KOMPAS

Yunarto Wijaya

The coalition agreement is just the initial guidelines. The key to the success of managing a coalition cabinet is also greatly influenced by how Jokowi manages his executive apparatus. As reminded by Araujo et al (2008), coalition management has the characteristic of day by day. In this case, the president can make political transfers (for example other public positions or support in the regional elections), financial transfers (for example: pork barrels) or granting political concessions as a bargaining tool to ensure government stability. Government stability is important. However, as the public, we need to ensure that stability should not be redeemed at high costs, whether it is in the form of a waste of state finances or the weakening of the democratic process, for example.

Yunarto Wijaya, Executive Director of Charta Politika Indonesia