Learning From the 2019 Presidential Election
The Constitutional Court (MK) rejected all arguments that the Prabowo Subianto-Sandiaga Uno camp put forth during the 2019 election dispute. Officially, Joko “Jokowi” Widodo and Ma’ruf Amin will be the president and vice president, respectively, of the Republic of Indonesia for the 2019-2024 term.
In his press statement, Prabowo expressed his respect for the MK\'s decision. However, he still opened the possibility of taking another constitutional path. Among his supporters, the reaction varied. A part of them chose to move on; some are unmoved. They are firm with their belief that the winner of the presidential election had cheated. The accusation of fraud was raised from the beginning of the campaign period with various arguments. This narrative also became the driving force for some supporters of presidential and vice-presidential candidate pair number 02 to carry out various protests against the result of the presidential election, which led to riots in May.
Fruits of the strategy
The firmness of attitude among Prabowo-Sandi voters was a reasonable implication of the campaign strategy. In this context, the number 02 pair made full use of the basic capital of the overflow of the 2014 presidential election and the 2017 Jakarta gubernatorial election. Because they faced the incumbents, they also questioned the country’s economic performance. This was a reasonable choice because in various surveys, the level of voter satisfaction on the performance of the Jokowi-Kalla government in this area was the lowest among other fields. As a result, the main issues were religion (criminalization of ulema and/or parts of the now defunct PKI communist party), economy (failure and or impartiality in the economic field), as well as ethnicity (Chinese ethnic domination and or the threat of Chinese annexation).
These issues were marketed by an emotional negative approach (especially anger). According to Steenbergen and Ellis (2006), anger is only triggered if it is able to show that politicians who have the authority do not want and or are unable to handle the problems in question, especially in terms economics and morality. In the context of the 2019 presidential election, Prabowo-Sandi supporters extended the responsibilities of the incumbent widely, so that everything and in various fields was considered wrong. Whenever there was a mistake or disaster, it always ended with, "It’s all Jokowi\'s fault".
Some number 02 voters internalized the issues by rationalizing the choice. As referred to by Lodge and Tober (2007), rationalization was carried out by giving a stronger (read: more positive) assessment of issues that were concurrent with what they had previously believed. In this connection, voters were also motivated to look for information that was in harmony with what they believed in and ignored what was not compatible with what they believed (conformation bias) and accept without a critical attitude every information that was concurrent with pre-existing beliefs. On the contrary, examining carefully and or unfairly assessing information that was not concurrent with pre-existing beliefs (disconfirmation bias).
As a consequence, voters who had a strong belief in something would behave more extremely when faced with information that was pro and contra because they ignored those that were inconsistent and
took for granted information that was in line with existing beliefs (attitude polarization). In essence, this rationalization was stronger in people who understood deeply about political issues than those who lacked knowledge and or sophisticated reasoning about political issues.
Another strategy applied by Prabowo-Sandi was to intensify smear campaigns. This was a generic strategy in every election and the Jokowi-Amin camp also did it. Smear campaigns can encourage voters to shift their preferences, at least to becoming abstentions. Smear campaigns were also intended to influence swing voters to have a negative assessment against competitors. The problem was that the smear campaigns did not always encourage voters to explore further information and or reduce voter participation. The findings of Klein and Ahluwalia (2005), for example, showed that negative messages are only effective for voters who did not like the candidates who were the target of the negative messages. The findings of Meffert et al. (2006) also showed that negative messages could be perceived in the opposite way. Voters may judge the negative messages as bad and/or discount them.
The swift burst of false news was also the fruit of the attitude of the voters who conducted bias disconfirmation.
Nevertheless, negative messages do not mean there is no point. According to Redlawsk et al (2010), the failure of negative messages to persuade voters is more due to the inability to achieve what he calls a tipping point. When this critical tipping point is reached, voters will be forced to reevaluate their preferences. This is where the main role of false news is that of "strong medicine". In the context of the 2019 presidential election, negative messages contained more false news. Its intensity was high and the expansion of the theme was deep. The swift burst of false news was also the fruit of the attitude of the voters who conducted bias disconfirmation.
As long as the message was in harmony with what they believed and or was in favor of their presidential candidates, the accuracy of the content was no longer questioned and therefore also quickly shared in various media, especially social media and conversations. Not surprisingly, if up to a certain extent, a smear campaign had succeeded in influencing the evaluation among some voters on their presidential and vice-presidential candidates, especially Jokowi-Amin. To prevent negative messages and false news from surpassing this critical tipping point, Jokowi actively carried out various symbolic actions to prove himself a devout Muslim and also being close to ulema. At the level of the supporters, the voters followed to market negative emotional approaches. Initially, it encouraged more general anxiety (for example: the threat to democracy or freedom). Later, fear was raised by highlighting the roles and agendas of organized religious groups that were part of Prabowo-Sandiaga’s supporters.
On a certain scale, the response of the supporters of candidate pair number 01 to the attacks of opinions launched by the supporters of the pair number 02 actually thickened the confidence of some Prabowo-Sandi voters that Jokowi and or his supporters were "ideologically enemies". The fact that the vice presidential candidate of Jokowi was an ulema and also the head of the Indonesian Ulema Council (MUI) did not obstruct that belief. On the contrary, the attitude of the candidate pair number 02 also increased the escalation of anger in some Jokowi-Amin supporters. There were at least two issues that triggered this anger. First, the self-presentation of some groups supporting the number 02 pair that they were the true followers of Islam and the infidel or heretical labeling to any person or group who did not agree with their position. Second, social labeling. Precisely, the stigma of choosing Jokowi-Amin was identified with the term "dumb" and or because the voters needed lunch packs or transport money.
Similarities
Generally speaking, voters of number 01 and 02 shared similarities in a number of ways. First, they both believed that they had made the right choice because they felt their decision was based on accurate
information and strong arguments. What they ignored was the initial preference bias that affected the way they processed information that came later. Armed with this belief, they felt to have the noble obligation to "straighten out" voters of the opponents whom they considered wrong and or deficient. Refusal triggered new anger. And this became more personal because what was then questioned was the attitude of friends, colleagues or relatives.
The difference was that the critical voters in the number 01 stronghold were more expressive and open to the criticism and mockery, while the critical voters of number 02 did it more often in limited forums.
Second, as a follow-up of the activation of rationalizing the choices, some voters who could be classified as die-hard became worshipers. They considered their candidate as the "savior". Whether being realized or not, both Jokowi and Prabowo reinforced it. At least they did that to ensure and maintain the support of their voters. Related to this, the devotees in both camps did not like critical voters who were in the same camp with them because the critical voters did not hesitate to criticize the presidential candidate and make fun of the behavior of the worshipers. The difference was that the critical voters in the number 01 stronghold were more expressive and open to the criticism and mockery, while the critical voters of number 02 did it more often in limited forums.
Third, some voters of number 01 or 02 also grew the spirit that “the most important thing is to win first". Its practical implication was that they understood and even contributed to justifying the behavior of their respective presidential candidates even though they were personally against their standards. At the level of ideas, they also adopted the ideas of the presidential candidates that they supported even though they had previously been opposed to the policy. This behavior explained why some voters suddenly seemed inconsistent with the words/attitudes that had been shown to others.
Fourth, there were some voters from both camps who shifted their stance the 2019 presidential election contestation. This occurred when the rationalization of their choices was disrupted. The exposure to various information and/or changes in the attitude of the presidential candidates made them feel that the candidate they supported was not the right figure to choose. But to turn around or be in abstention, they also could not do it for various reasons. In a situation like this, they positioned the presidential election as no longer a matter of number 01 vs 02, but the contestation of values and or battle between their groups and those positioned as enemies. Some voters of number 02, for example, later interpreted the presidential election as a battleground to defend religion or ulema. Among voters of number 01, there were those who believed the presidential election was a gamble regarding the future of diversity in religion or diversity in the nation.
This perspective became both new energy and a shield when facing information that was not concurrent with what they previously believed. Despite the risks of being highly exaggerated, this transformation of perspectives could also be regarded as the hijacking of the contestation space. One of its implications: a command shift. Instructions and appeals by the presidential candidate would be ignored if they were not in line with the (new) interests they believed to have been being fought for.
New normality
The logical consequence of "hijacking" the contestation space was the opening for political-economic interest groups to carry out political maneuvers. They did not only distort the democratic event, but it was also possible to initiate various activities that allowed various non-democratic actions to be carried out, such as riots and killings. More than that, the heightened division among some voters failed to subside political tensions even though the election was over. At least, there are two sources that have the potential to trigger this tension. First, Prabowo\'s supporting groups are organized and or united with narratives about "defending religion and or defending ulema". As interest groups, involvement in political dynamics is not only useful for pushing their political agenda but also as a means of "caring for" and "developing" their political machinery; at this point, a meeting of interests with "stowaways" that have economic or political motives can occur.
The second trigger comes from voters of number 01 and 02 who do not feel related to their choice. This happens if they feel that the Jokowi-Amin government is too "pragmatic" and or opens space for the enactment of restrictions on democracy. They are indeed unable to directly mobilize the masses but are able to influence the formation of public opinion, especially in mass media or social media channels. The third trigger comes from contestation in the political elite itself. The entry point can be a matter of composition and or "quota" in the cabinet. However, it can also be because the projection of the 2024 election contestation is too early. The latter triggers the potential not to be "disciplined", both in the body of the cabinet and in the House of Representatives.
Therefore, there is no easy way for Jokowi-Amin. Choices that are too far from the average acceptability of the voters must be avoided. The choice of forming a "super rainbow" cabinet, which includes almost all election participants, for example, besides being disliked, does not guarantee the creation of a positive political condition. But, at the same time, Jokowi needs to show his leadership with the courage to make unpopular decisions in order to maintain the unity and diversity of the nation and in the context of boosting national competitiveness. In short, commotion will continue to occur. And, this is (new) normality in politics in the country. Good luck to explore it!
Yunarto Wijaya, Executive director of Charta Politika Indonesia