Predicting Electoral Alliances
The key variables in 2009, 2014 and 2019 were the high electability of prospective presidential nominees and the existence of popular incumbents, so the map of potential alliances was predictable.
Political analysts studying the electoral map have so far reached a consensus that the map for the 2024 presidential election (Pilpres) is not yet established. The presidential election is still anybody’s game.
The map will become clearer once electoral alliances have been formed or can be more easily predicted.
Pilpres alliances should meet two conditions: they must have fulfilled the presidential nomination threshold and they must have a presidential candidate and running mate. So far, none of the potential alliances meet both conditions.
Compared with the last three presidential elections, the situation leading up to 2024 indeed presents more variables that are not easy to predict. The key variables are also not found in the lead-up to 2024.
Less than 1.5 years before Pilpres 2024, these two key variables are absent.
The key variables in 2009, 2014 and 2019 were the high electability of prospective presidential nominees and the existence of popular incumbents, so the map of potential alliances was predictable. Less than 1.5 years before Pilpres 2024, these two key variables are absent.
At least four main variables can be used to predict potential Pilpres alliances: the presidential threshold, the map of public support, as reflected in the electability of potential nominees, interparty communication or interaction, and the will of decision-makers in the political parties. Only one of the four variables are fixed, which is the presidential threshold. The other three, especially the third and fourth variables, are as yet uncertain.
Arena and public support
The Pilpres arena, or the field of competition, depends on the regulation on who can be declared the winner and which candidates may compete. The arena refers to the duration and the pattern of the contest.
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There are two main provisions here. First, the Constitution stipulates that the Pilpres follow a two-round. Whether a second round is held depends on whether there are more than two candidate pairs and whether the first round produces a clear winner who has gained more than 50 percent of votes, on the condition that the distribution of votes fulfills the constitutional requirements.
The second provision is the presidential threshold. The law stipulates only a party or an alliance of parties that has won a minimum 20 percent of seats in the House of Representatives (DPR) or 25 percent of the total votes in the previous legislative election are eligible to nominate a presidential pair.
With the present configuration of seats in the DPR, a maximum of four alliances can be formed. Drawing on the experience in the previous general election, a minimum of two alliances can be formed. If only two alliances are formed, the Pilpres will involve only one round. So far, three or four potential alliances are indicated, with the possibility of at least two camps, like in 2014 and 2019.
There is a potential for three camps: the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P), the United Indonesia Coalition (KIB) and an alliance between Gerindra with the National Awakening Party (PKB). Three other parties, NasDem, the Democratic Party and the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS), could also form another potential alliance.
Based on the regulatory variable for the competition arena, the map is clear enough, but the number of alliances is limited to two, three or four. It is not any clearer than this yet. The regulatory provisions on the electoral arena are the best indicator for predicting Pilpres alliances relative to other predictors.
What is unclear is who is the most suitable running mate for these figures.
The second indicator is the electability rate of potential nominees, which reflects public aspirations. This second variable is actually quite clear. All national opinion polls over the last two years indicate that the public is mainly rallied behind three figures: Prabowo Subianto, Ganjar Pranowo and Anies Baswedan. What is unclear is who is the most suitable running mate for these figures.
Public opinion polls are usually a strong indicator for predicting potential nominees. In other democratic countries that hold presidential elections, like the United States, Brazil and South Korea, independent or nonparty candidates are allowed, which makes public support a strong indicator. Figures with strong enough public support usually run for the presidency, either through parties or as independents.
In Indonesia, as only political parties can nominate candidates, public support for prospective candidates, let alone figures not affiliated with parties or without party backing, does not always pave the way for being nominated as a presidential or a vice presidential candidate. Therefore, although we have an idea of who the public wants as candidates, the candidacy map will remain unclear until the parties make a decision.
Interparty interaction
The third variable is interparty interaction. Two criteria apply here. First, does a certain party have any long-term reason to form close ties or an alliance with one party compared to another? Second, does a certain party have any long-term objection to forming close ties or an alliance with one party compared to another?
The answer to both questions regarding this variable is the same: none. No parties have a strong long-term reason to form close ties or an alliance with one party compared to another. Those that object to forming an alliance are only the Democratic Party with the PDI-P and the PKS with the PDI-P.
Aside from these, no parties have a strong reason to form an alliance with each other. This means that interparty interaction can be very volatile and change over time. One party can form an alliance with any other party.
That is why time is the only factor that can stabilize their interactions. When the deadline approaches for registering the candidate pairs, the alliances will become clear. When there is still a long time (around 1.5 years until candidate registration) like now, no clear pattern will emerge in terms of alliances. The interparty interaction variable is hard to predict in a fairly accurate way.
As only one of the three variables is certain, the factors that the party elite considers can also change over time.
The fourth is the will of the party elite or decision-makers. Like interparty interaction, this factor does not stand alone. The party elite considers many factors, including the above three variables. As only one of the three variables is certain, the factors that the party elite considers can also change over time.
For example, if a party’s decision-makers do not intend to nominate one of the three top popular names and instead want their party and the party’s candidates to win, their decision must also inevitably consider whether none of the other parties will nominate one of the three popular figures.
If a certain party nominates one of the top three names, the probability for another party to defeat it will be greater if the latter nominates one of the two other popular names. As such, a party will inevitably consider nominating one of the three popular figures.
The challenge is that every party will think the same way. Consequently, none will dare to announce its candidate pairs (nominees for president and vice president). So, the public will also find it hard to predict a party elite’s intentions, because the factors they consider can also change until the deadline for candidate registration nears.
Waiting game
Amid the uncertainty of three of the four Pilpres alliance indicators, the key variable is the presence of dominant potential nominees (that is, figures that consistently have an electability rate of above 40 percent) or the presence of popular incumbents that will be difficult to beat.
The Pilpres alliances at the time were thus also easier to predict.
There incumbents were popular in 2009 and 2019, so the Pilpres alliances were easier to predict and form. In 2014 there were no popular incumbents, but there were two dominant figures who were potential nominees: Prabowo Subianto and Joko Widodo. The Pilpres alliances at the time were thus also easier to predict.
As Pilpres 2024 approaches, both popular incumbents and dominant aspiring candidates are absent. The chance of an alliance to win the Pilpres highly depends on the composition and strategy other alliances. Those that first announce their alliance will enable other parties to build an alliance, if time allows.
Therefore, we will most likely be presented with a waiting game between parties and between potential alliances until it the time draws even closer to the registration deadline. Before long, parties will be maneuvering by holding political gatherings in various directions.
Djayadi Hanan, Political science lecturer at the Indonesian International Islamic University (UIII), Executive Director of the Indonesian Survey Institute (LSI)
(This article was translated by Aris Prawira)