Papua’s Regional Proliferation Risks End Ep in Flip-Flopping Governance
For the regional proliferation policy not to end up in governance failure, the commitment and political will of all parties is a must.
Regional administration proliferation is aimed at improving public welfare, accelerating development, improving public services and enhancing competitiveness.
However, unless it is done with thorough preparations in the readiness and capability of the local governing administration, the new autonomous regions (DOB) will fail.
Technically and substantively, it seems that the planned three new regions are not yet ready to become autonomous provinces. They are South Papua, Central Papua, and Papua Pegunungan. In addition, the political conditions leading up to the 2024 general election would make the government transition – if the regional proliferation goes on as planned – too complex a task for the central government to handle.
The preparation works during the transitional period would include the formation and filling-in of administrative apparatuses, the establishment of the Papuan People's Assembly, as well as the supervision of the organization of administration head elections for new provinces.
There are at least three reasons why the regional proliferation plan for Papua to have new three provinces cannot be implemented yet. Otherwise, it could potentially fail. First, the regional administering capacity is still limited compared to other regions in Indonesia, especially in the aspect of anticorruption management.
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The Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK)-administered 2021 Integrity Assessment Survey (IAS) shows the highly vulnerable risk of corruption in the Papua region compared to other regions in Indonesia. On a scale of 0-100, the IAS index in Papua was 58.04 or below the national average of 72.4.
The capacity of the regions in anticorruption management in eight aspects of governance was also low. Compares to the national average of 78.76 (scale of 0-100), the value of Monitoring Corruption Prevention (MCP) in Papua in 2020, based on KPK data, was only 68. The eight aspects were the regional budget (APBD) planning, procurement of goods and services, integrated one-stop services, Government Internal Supervisory Apparatus (APIP), management of state civil servants (ASN), optimization of regional taxes, management of regional assets and management of village funds.
Local governments’ capacity in the implementation of anticorruption programs is crucial to the management of the Special Autonomy Funds for Papua, which increased in 2021 by 2.25 percent. The funds were apportioned from the National General Allocation Funds based on Law No. 2/2021. Data from the Finance Ministry (2021) shows that the total allocation of the Special Autonomy Funds and Additional Infrastructure Fund (DTI) for Papua in the last 20 years (2002-2021) reached Rp 99.58 trillion (US$6.65 billion), with an annual growth of 9.6 percent at average.
Forming a new autonomous province in Papua, as stated in Law No. 2/2021, can be done on a top-down basis, but the weak support from local political elites can trigger political instability in the region.
Second, the regional proliferation policy will potentially lead to failed new provinces on the grounds that it has not received support from local political institutions such as the Papuan People's Council (MRP). Indeed, forming a new autonomous province in Papua, as stated in Law No. 2/2021, can be done on a top-down basis, but the weak support from local political elites can trigger political instability in the region. With a reference to Regional Government Law No. 23/2014, the approval of the local legislative body (DPRD) and the administration head (governor) of the parent province is required for the proliferation.
The regional proliferation plan has also caused a division in the community marked by pros and cons over the formation of new provinces. Regarding Central Papua province, conflicts of interest are evident among the regency/municipality heads over the location of the provincial capital city before the central government and the House of Representatives (DPR) decided to choose Nabire as the capital city over Timika. While Timika will be pushed to become the economic development center for the new province, the implications of the decision are expected to drag on revolving over conflict of legitimacy. Third, a detailed mechanism is still lacking over “the three-year establishment of the preparatory area” stipulated in Law No. 23/2014 on regional governments.
The establishment of a preparatory area is important to measure readiness by looking into the potential of the region before it can become a new province. The assessment, for example, is related to the economic and financial potential of the region, the capacity of regional administration, the potential regions’ income, as well as the provision of human resources, especially those for bureaucracy and government employment (ASN). Given the specific conditions in Papua, the establishment of a preparatory area is becoming more urgent, but unfortunately, this is not regulated in the revised Papua Special Autonomy Law.
Fourth, specifically for South Papua, the scheme for it to become a new province will fall short of meeting the basic administrative requirement that a province has to have at least five regencies/municipalities.
Concerns about the bleak prospects for the new regions can serve as a source for discussion in the hope that future public policymaking can be prepared more comprehensively.
The studies on newly formed provinces by the National Development Planning Agency (Bappenas) and United Nations Development Program (UNDP) in 2008 show that the condition of the new administrative regions did not show any significant improvement in the aspects of economy, regional finances, public services and governance within five years of the regional autonomy implementation (2000-2005)
They generally remained under the control of and dependent on their parent administrations. The studies concluded that from the economic point of view, the underdevelopment was attributable to the limited human resources (SDM) and natural resources (SDA).
Implications
The formation of new autonomous regions will bring about economic, political, administrative and electoral implications. The following part focuses on looking at the implications of the electoral aspect. First, the implications for the urgency to reorganize the electoral districts (Dapil) both at the DPR and provincial legislative (DPRD) with their quota of membership.
The proliferation of the Papua region will consequently push up the number of members of the DPR and DPR Papua as legislative seat allocation will have to be expanded. There are two options: either by virtue of the limited revision of Election Law No. 7/2017 or the issuance of a government regulation in lieu of a law (Perppu) that regulates the number of seats in the DPR and the electoral districts for the DPR. The issuance of a government regulation in lieu of law as the implication of the post-establishment electoral implications needs to be done quickly, considering that the 2024 election stages have already started.
In the Election Law, the number of DPR members is 575 seats and the allocation of seats per electoral district is regulated to be three seats at a minimum and 10 seats at a maximum. Based on the electoral districts, Papua currently has 10 seats at the DPR. After the expansion into four provinces, and with the assumption that each province gets a minimum of three seats, there will be 12 seats allocated for the Papua region. This means an increase of two seats from the current allocation quota.
Meanwhile, at the provincial level, there are currently 69 seats available at DPRD Papua, 55 seats based on the Election Law and 14 seats on the special autonomy status. The regional administrative proliferation will need reallocations of the number of seats in the four provinces in Papua. If a population-based simulation is carried out using Indonesia Statistics (BPS) 2021 census data, the Papua DPRD (parent province) will be made up of 45 seats, South Papua, Central Papua 45 seats and Papua Pegunungan 45 seats.
That simulation has yet to take into account the special autonomy status, which will bring the number of seat allocations in Papua up from 55 (as one province) to 170 seats.
Second, the implication is related to the implementation of elections, which will force a jack-up in the election budget from being allocated for the current 34 to 37 provinces. It also means the expanded recruitment of local election organizers, both for the local election commission (KPUD) and the election supervisory agency (Bawaslu).
The third is the implication of registering political parties. The Election Law states that political parties must have representation in all provinces for eligible participation in the elections. The expanded provinces will require the political parties have branches of representation in those new provinces.
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The fourth implication will be the increased number of Regional Representative Council (DPD) members from four to 12. Another issue that must be addressed is the regional head elections (Pilkada). The leadership of regional heads is an important element in dealing with the drawback factors to prevent the proliferation program from turning into failed administrations.
The CSIS study (2021) shows that the successful implementation of regional autonomy in a number of regions in Indonesia has weighed on the role and policy innovations carried out by regional heads.
Mitigation
Amid the complex problems facing the regional proliferation policy, the formation of an administration apparatus needs to be thoroughly prepared. While the law requires up to 80 percent accommodation for indigenous Papuans (OAP) out of the total number of bureaucracy staffers, demographic changes in some areas in Papua will have to be taken into consideration.
Conflicts over access to government employment between OAP and non-OAP are likely to linger, especially in the areas where the population has become more diverse. This is the case in two regencies in South Papua, namely Merauke and Boven Digoel.
An academic study on the establishment of South Papua published by Gadjah Mada University (2021) confirms the demographic changes in those two regencies. In Merauke, the total population of OAP at the time of the study was only 30.05 percent, the rest being non-OAP. In Boven Digoel, OAP constituted 48.79 percent of the total population. Meanwhile, in Asmat and Mappi, OAP still dominated the population with above 80 percent.
Another crucial aspect that needs to be tackled is how to coordinate at the level of central government with the handling of Papua being the domain of many units in the ministries and institutions. Another concern is the fact that the Papua Special Agency has not been formed as mandated by the revised Special Autonomy Law.
While the central government has pledged commitment to safeguarding the transitional period for the planned new provinces until having definitive regional heads, the lack of integration among the ministries and state institutions specially tasked with the policy execution on Papua is feared to cause overlapping decisions in the field. So, for the regional proliferation policy not to end up in governance failure, the commitment and political will of all parties is a must.
Arya Fernandes
Arya Fernandes, Head of Politics and Social Change Department, Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
This article was translated by Musthofid.
