Preelection Coalition

The 2024 national election – although it still includes the provincial and regency/city legislative council (DPRD) elections – is the second simultaneous election in Indonesia after the 2019 concurrent polls.

If we refer to the Duvergerian theory, one of its mechanical effects will now start to become visible: a "preelection" parties coalition, namely an agreement between political parties, especially in the context of facing the presidential election (pilpres), before the election stage begins. A preelection coalition cannot be understood as a coalition before the election, which can be misunderstood as a coalition prior to voting day. Nor is it a last-minute coalition that is built before the deadline for the registration (nomination) of the names of presidential candidates and their vice presidents. Party coalitions that are formed when the election stage begins, such as the registration of legislative candidates or even when the campaign has started, cannot be called "preelection" coalitions because their functions and effects will be greatly reduced.

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Golkar, the National Mandate Party (PAN) and United Development Party (PPP), which have agreed to unite under the umbrella of the United Indonesia Coalition (KIB) to face the electoral "rain" in February 2024, are examples of preelection coalitions. Apart from various speculations regarding the motives, goals and political actors behind the institutionalization of the political consensus among the three parties, we need to rationalize – and at the same time troubleshoot – the preelection coalition for the consolidation of democracy in Indonesia.

From the perspective of coalition members, this toolbox is the “political stuff” they are looking for.

However, what is clear is that the party elite has learned how important it is to build a strong political bloc before the election campaign begins. After all, the presidential system provides an executive toolbox for the elected president to consolidate and coordinate coalitions and legislatures. From the perspective of coalition members, this toolbox is the “political stuff” they are looking for.

These executive tools are in the form of positions in Cabinet ministries (ministry portfolio) to realize political platforms, "spoils of war" (spoils of office) in the form of access to state projects, for example, as well as "welfare distribution" (pork barrels), both visible or unseen by the public. PAN, for example, took important lessons from the "fasting" or refraining from ministerial seats since they knew that post-election coalitions were not the same as in previous elections.

Simultaneous elections that seem simple, however, are a game-changer that forces politicians and party leaders to change the inter-party political formula: from wait-and-see to prepare-early.

Nevertheless, the psychological effect of the simultaneous elections on voters – consistency of preference for the same party and presidential candidates or direct voting – is still very likely to remain small or mixed as in the 2019 election.

This is natural in an open proportional system where voters are mobilized or their political preferences are also activated by legislative candidates who move to follow the constituent pendulum rather than the party's decision line. In 2019, candidates in West Sumatra, for example, preferred to remain silent or even openly support Prabowo even though his party nominated Jokowi. Finally, the myth of the coattail effect – the tendency of voters to vote for the party/candidate that supports or endorses their chosen presidential candidate – does not work.

Moreover, the clientelist approach, which in most cases works effectively in the electoral contest of the candidates, also contributes to disrupting the psychological effects of the simultaneous elections.

However, the electoral fate is determined by the extent to which the rupiah is distributed to households.

The gains of legislative seats are not determined by the extent to which the party's platform reaches voters and accommodates their preferences; nor is it the extent to which parties are able to harmonize the choices of their constituent presidential candidates; and also not the extent to which the candidates directly campaigned or boost their image. However, the electoral fate is determined by the extent to which the rupiah is distributed to households.

Split voting is very likely to occur in 2024. However, preelection coalitions such as the one by Golkar-PAN-PPP will reduce the zig-zag voting behavior. Coalition member parties that have built agreements and understandings before the election stage begins will be better prepared to recruit and select legislative candidates who not only function as vote-getters but also party workers.

Aside from candidates who are more disciplined and at the same time contribute votes to the party, preelection coalitions allow parties to realize the main electoral agenda that has positive implications for coalition members: the coalitional convention or the coalition preelection. This gotong royong (mutual cooperation) convention is common in several Latin American countries, such as Peru and Uruguay, although some of them are ceremonial due to the presence of an electorally strong candidate from one of the coalition parties.

This means that if Gerindra succeeds in building a coalition before the election stage, the coalition primaries will more substantially target the vice president. Meanwhile, KIBs that do not have strong electoral candidates will get abundant incentives if they involve the public in determining their presidential or vice-presidential candidates.

Inclusive candidacy – nominations determined by both party members and the voting population – in the literature always increases party votes. The taste of the public, and not the taste of the elite, in candidacy, is the key to winning elections. And inclusive conventions are an important way to capture public tastes.

Although wait-and-see is a strategy in itself, waiting too long will also have implications for loss of momentum; and opportunity may not come twice. This is what explains the preelection coalition along with its electoral programs carried out in many presidential countries with the design of simultaneous elections. The primaries by each party, particularly the Republicans and the Democrats in every state in the United States are held on average one year before the general election, as are many countries in Latin America that have long adopted simultaneous presidential and legislative elections.

Political calculus and logistics in forming coalitions can have implications for the next five years or even more.

My observation is that there are at least 18 countries in Latin America that incorporate preelection coalitions into their legislation. This means that parties and voters in Indonesia will feel a positive effect on the formation of party coalitions at least one year before the general election or February 2023 – or no later than May 2023, which is said to be on the agenda of the General Elections Commission, namely the registration of candidates. Of course, the formation of a party coalition is different from organizing a car or motorcycle race where the organizers and spectators can disperse immediately after the race is over. Political calculus and logistics in forming coalitions can have implications for the next five years or even more.

Lastly, several studies argue that parties in Indonesia are tools of the oligarchs in maintaining assets and the presidential election is a “political exchange” where they invest in each candidate. However, electoral institutions such as party coalitions at least maintain the function of elections as a public accountability mechanism: selecting candidates (read: parties or party coalitions) that are considered no worse than all the bad ones.

KOMPAS/NINO CITRA ANUGRAHANTO

Arya Budi

Arya Budi, Lecturer at the Department of Politics and Government, UGM; Research Director of Poltracking Indonesia

(This article was translated by Kurniawan Siswo)