Preventing Religious Conservatism

Earlier this month, police arrested Abdul Qadir Baraja, the leader of the Khilafatul Muslimin (KM), in Lampung (7/6/2022).

This arrest was the result of a motorbike convoy of KM members carrying large Arabic-language flags in Cawang, East Jakarta, and in several other areas (29/5/2022). This incident has raised many questions from the public: why is this organization that was founded 25 years ago only showing off now?

In the midst of a society that is fed up with intolerant, radical and extremist groups, why are they allowed to develop? Who are they? What can the state and society do?

State vs ‘ecosystem’ caliphate

Answering the questions above is clearly very important considering that before the political year of the 2024 presidential election, any event — especially related to ideological issues and with the potential for mass mobilization — will easily be linked to national political issues. It seems that the KM has also taken advantage of this opportunity by inviting the people, as stated in the banner they carried during the convoy, to welcome the "awakening of the Khilafah Islamiyah".

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To avoid an analysis that is biased in practical politics above, I will dissect the KM phenomenon with an “ecosystem” analysis tool. The term is usually used in biological studies to denote “a defined geographic area in which plants, animals and other organisms, as well as the weather and the contours of the soil, work together to form a life of its own.”

The dynamic relations here in the "ecosystem" above will be modified by looking at the social interactions that occur between KM components through 1) people or individuals involved in the KM, 2) places where they carry out activities, such as schools, Quran recitation gatherings and finally 3) the platforms or media where the KM disseminates its understanding to new members or prospective members, such as social media, WhatsApp, Telegram and other sites (Ramakrishna 2022).

This means that the state can only deal with what appears on the surface and has not yet explored the root causes of the birth of a group like this KM.

By seeing the KM as part of the "ecosystem", the arrest of the leader and several members of the KM by the police is just like dealing with the iceberg phenomenon of the caliphate ecosystem in Indonesia. This means that the state can only deal with what appears on the surface and has not yet explored the root causes of the birth of a group like this KM.

The first step that the state must take is to understand the long process of the awakening of the KM itself. In this context, United States political expert Ted Gurr in Why Men Rebel (1970) reminded of the importance of looking at power relations or the "structure" in groups that carry out rebellions or fight against mainstream groups. According to Gurr, grievances or “disappointments” over sociopolitical conditions are often a powerful trigger for individuals to mbalelo (be rebellious).

Individuals in the KM

Like a Covid-19 patient, the initial rebellious individual is patient zero, or "the first case" who then transmits the disease to other people. In the context of the KM, patient zero is Abdul Qadir Baraja. He was disappointed with the political system of the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia (NKRI), which is based on Pancasila.

The disappointment did not come suddenly. Baraja is a former follower of the Islamic State of Indonesia (NII). Genealogically, the KM is one of the 'splinters' of the NII. However, the KM has a political imagination that transcends the nation-state, namely the global caliphate system. This concept is similar to the concept of Hizbut-Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) and also the Islamic State group in Iraq and Syria (ISIS).

Ironically, as a state political system, the khilafa (Islamic State) promoted by the KM is indeed an inevitable part of Islamic history. As a historical reality, the government and society do not need to stigmatize this caliphate narrative. However, what needs to be emphasized to Muslims is that the khilafah system is not the only system of government that is recognized and practiced in the Islamic world. There are other systems, such as monarchies, sultanates and republics.

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Although disappointed with the NKRI system, the KM is not a terror organization like Jamaah Islamiyah (JI) or Jamaah Ansharut Daulah (JAD). However, that does not mean that there are no KM sympathizers who are not involved in acts of terrorism. For example, two KM members, Jurnal Kurniawa and Noval Agus Syahroni, were arrested by Densus 88 at the end of 2019 in connection with the stabbing of the Coordinating Minister for Politics, Law and Security Wiranto (Abu Zee and Abu Rara network). Prior to establishing the KM, Baraja was involved in the Borobudur Temple explosion in the 1980s.

In early 2014, featured on the KM website, one of the KM leaders, ustad Zulkifli Rahman, discussed with several “Muslim leaders”, such as ustad Farid Okbah, a senior JI member who had been arrested by Densus 88 regarding JI funding, and Jamaah Ansharut Tauhid (JAT) Jakarta area ustad Harists Amir Falah.

The dynamics above can be read that even though the KM does not systematically (or maybe has not) used acts of terrorism, they live in an "ecosystem" that rejects the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia.

Individuals in this "ecosystem" may differ in terms of strategy, but they are still united by the same idea and dream, namely the presence of an Islamic political system in Indonesia and then throughout the world.

They usually have three main characteristics: 1) feeling "superior" or feeling better and right compared with other groups, 2) strong internal group loyalty and 3) a thirst for political power, which is ironically wrapped in religious language. Individuals in this "ecosystem" may differ in terms of strategy, but they are still united by the same idea and dream, namely the presence of an Islamic political system in Indonesia and then throughout the world.

KM activity location

KM is based in Lampung, a strategic caliphate “ecosystem” for them. Apart from the fact that Lampung connects the islands of Sumatra and Java, historically, Lampung, especially in Talangsari village, was the scene of the massacre of hundreds of Islamic activists by security forces during the New Order era in the late 1980s. At that time, these Islamic activists rejected Pancasila as the sole principle of the state. Even though it has been more than 30 years since the Talangsari incident, the husks of grievance to the authorities, as identified by Gurr above, seem to be well cared for by individuals in the caliphate “ecosystem” such as Baraja.

In Lampung, the KM has a religious education institution named Pondok Pesantren Ukhuwah Islamiyah (PPUI) that has 182 students and each alumnus is required to serve one year at the KM. With its cadre system, the KM likely has several other branches in Indonesia, such as in Bima, Bekasi, and several in Central Java cities, such as Brebes and Klaten, as well as other regions.

Media for ideology dissemination

The KM carries out da’wah (Islamic propagation) to raise public understanding of the caliphate just like the HTI. They have a fan page called Al Khilafah and a monthly newsletter with the same name. The dangerous narrative on this page is how they manipulate history by linking the world's acknowledgment of Indonesia's NII until it is finally continued.

Compared with the HTI, the KM tends to be more gentle and takes a da'wah approach. They are also not a takfiri group (a group that labels people outside their group as infidels). This understanding of the caliphate-style da'wah is disseminated by the KM on a massive scale, but quietly, both online and offline. The offline method is by going door-to-door as well as the establishment of a number of educational institutions in several regions in Indonesia.

Today, Nanang's younger sister, who is married to an ISIS supporter from Algeria, is still in a Syrian refugee camp with her son.

With the incessant spread of this caliphate ideology, it is not surprising that some KM members are fascinated by the ISIS caliphate project in Iraq and Syria. One of the KM leaders who is diligent in developing the KM online study materials, Nanang Pambudianto, joined the Al Baghdadi caliphate project in Syria in 2014. He later died there. Today, Nanang's younger sister, who is married to an ISIS supporter from Algeria, is still in a Syrian refugee camp with her son.

To the author, Nanang's younger sister explained in an online interview the KM's vision: "The goal of the KM is to find as many members as possible in this world so that a caliphate in the style of Minhaj An Nubuah is born". This is a political concept in Arabic of a system of government that follows prophetic demands.

Law enforcement is not enough

Relying solely on law enforcement to deal with the "ecosystem" of the caliphate in Indonesia, such as the KM, is clearly not enough. Apart from draining the state's energy, the "ecosystem" will become more confident because they understand the loopholes in the law. They understand that the fate of the KM will be like the HTI and FPI. The state will dissolve the KM and all foundations that oversee their educational institutions.

Thousands of students will lose their place to study. Parents will be confused to find a new school for their children. If they continue to be stigmatized by the state and society, they will become indirect victims of the state's decision on this KM group. At this point, feelings of disappointment with the state will be easily aroused by KM sympathizers who feel the need to "retaliate" against the state in a different way.

In the study of terrorism, this phenomenon is often referred to as reciprocal radicalism. This phenomenon does not only apply to Muslim groups, but also to Christian groups. For example, after the execution of three death row convicts in the Poso rioting case, namely Fabianus Tibo, Marinus Riwu and Dominggus da Silva, in September 2003, 17 Christians from Poso got drunk and, angered by the executions, retaliated by killing two Muslim fish-loading truck drivers and their driver.

Facts on the ground show that the disbandment of the FPI and HTI did not change the direction of the potential for radicalism that grows in religious conservatism parks in Indonesia.

Therefore, it is necessary to think about an operation of "political inclusion" by the government through ministries and state agencies for KM followers throughout Indonesia. Facts on the ground show that the disbandment of the FPI and HTI did not change the direction of the potential for radicalism that grows in religious conservatism parks in Indonesia.

To prevent the proliferation of religious conservatism, the late Ahmad Syafii Maarif (2011) in the context of the state vs. "ecosystem" caliphate polemic once wrote: "Actually the two groups above can sit together in a more relaxed atmosphere for thinking about the future of this divided nation. Both groups are real political forces in Indonesian society. The fate of the nation will depend a lot on their success or failure to jointly formulate Indonesia's future agenda".

KOMPAS/DANU KUSWORO

Noor Huda Ismail

Noor Huda Ismail, Visiting Fellow RSIS, NTU Singapore

(This article was translated by Kurniawan Siswo)