The Dynamics of a Cabinet Reshuffle

Speculations about a third reshuffle of the Indonesia Advanced Cabinet (KIM) have been on and off since last October.

Will it be just speculation? Initially, it was believed that this reshuffle would take place last October or November coinciding with the two years stint of the Jokowi-Ma'ruf administration. The news immediately died down following the release of surveys by various institutions, showing that the level of public satisfaction with the government had risen sharply Charta Politika found that public satisfaction bounced from 62.4 percent (July 2021) to 70.1 percent (November 2021).

New reshuffle speculations have resurfaced lately. This is because the level of public satisfaction with the government's performance as a whole fell from 71.7 percent (January 2022) to 62.9 percent (April 2022). Satisfaction with the Cabinet's performance was even lower, at 50.1 percent with seven out of 10 respondents supporting a Cabinet reshuffle.

The difference in popularity (read: the level of public satisfaction) between Jokowi and the Cabinet shows the difference in how the public gave their views. This is similar to the findings of Panagopoulos (2007) in the United States regarding the popularity of then-secretary of state Colin Powell and president George W. Bush. In this case, Powell's popularity was determined more by media coverage of his activities, while Bush's popularity was mainly due to macro-partisan factors and economic conditions. Jokowi needs to be careful because the political situation can change public views. The ministers’ poor performance will be attributed to his own performance.

More than just being triggered by popularity problems, an option for a reshuffle is also to anticipate and respond to potentially unexpected shocks. Camerlo and Perez-Linan (2015a), distinguish two types of shocks. First is social protest, referring to policies that cause sharp/controversial polemics in public. Second is media scandals, referring to unlawful behavior of public officials such as corruption or abuse of power. The shocks can be distinguished based on their effects. According to Martinez-Gallardo (2014), there are shocks that have political effects (elections, regional elections, approval ratings) and shocks that have policy effects on natural disasters, economic crises and others.

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In the context of the Jokowi-Ma’ruf government, there are several shocks that still need to be mitigated related to policies, starting from the handling of cooking oil, fraudulent investment and the postponement of the three-term presidential/election to the construction of the new state capital. The Jokowi administration also needs to prepare alternative scenarios if the Russia-Ukrainian war continues, apart from keeping a check on Covid-19 pandemic mitigation.

The more immeasurable and very dynamic shocks are those which have political effects. The upcoming 2024 national election is predicted to carry political effects, both on the internal coalition and the political maneuvers of the opposition. Political polarization is predicted to escalate and horizontal conflicts will build up.

At this point, it makes sense to enable the reshuffle policy immediately. According to Camerlo and Perez-Linan (2015b), the reshuffle as a rearrangement of the allocation of ministerial positions is aimed at strengthening political support, streamlining administration, increasing the assistants’ technical capabilities (competence) and presenting ministers who have the same preferences as the president in the ideology and loyalty. There are two major themes that need to be observed: the party’s motivation and the selection of ministers.

Party’s motivation

Even though Jokowi constitutionally holds the exclusive power to form and reshuffle the Cabinet, the political reality speaks differently. Jokowi needs to consult and negotiate with the parties that will join the government coalition. Because in the context of a multiparty presidential system, the reshuffle must be placed as part of the government's legislation strategy (Amorim-Neto and Samuels, 2010).

It would be naive to expect Jokowi to insist on executing his prerogatives unilaterally. Constitutionally, the President's position is not strong enough with him having no veto power. Not only should Political-nuanced appointments receive the approval of the House of Representatives, but the government also is not powerful enough to run administration based on enforced decrees. Political exchanges are a necessity in the form of allocating ministerial seats and heeding the interests of coalition parties in policies in return for the support of the House

Jokowi needs to consider the motivations of the coalition parties, such as in its relation to the election calendar. At the beginning of the government term, coalition parties were more concerned about the number of ministers and ministerial posts they could gain as well as the policy agenda they found in line with their political interests. On the other hand, the closer the schedule for the next general election is, the parties’ prioritized interests have shifted to gaining as many votes as possible. Given the fact that the incumbent President cannot run for reelection, the parties look more selfish with them prioritizing their own interests without being bogged down in the coalition (Altman, 2000).

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The President's popularity has also become a consideration. Parties tend to be more motivated to detach from the coalition if the level of public satisfaction with the executive’s performance continues to decline. The parties begin preparations to join a coalition with the presidential candidate who they predict will be the winner in 2024.

On paper, parties will opt out of the coalition if the political costs outweigh the benefits. However, the political reality is not black and white. It is possible for a party to resort to a “friend stabbing from behind” strategy (staying in the coalition with a very pragmatic orientation and applying low coalition discipline in the Cabinet or House). It is also known as a “burning the barn” strategy, in which a party decides to stay in the coalition but continues to provoke Jokowi into expelling them from the coalition as it has expected with a view to positioning itself as “the victim of persecution”. The third option is to leave the coalition in a sportsmanlike manner as was done by the National Mandate Party (PAN) in the Jokowi-Jusuf Kalla era.

However, the effectiveness of abandoning the coalition also weighs on the time factor. The further away from the next election, the better to leave the coalition because it will allow sufficient time for rebranding. On the other hand, the closer to the election, the less attractive this option is. The party will find it difficult to rebrand itself. Voters may also judge that the party is not sincere in shifting its political orientation.

Minister selection

A Cabinet reshuffle is ultimately a matter of how to get rid of under-performing, incompetent, disloyal ministers or those whose ideological attitude detaches too far from the president (Indridason and Kim, 2008). However, reshuffling ministers is not as simple as firing employees and replacing them with new workers. In the context of a coalition government, the president needs to consider suggestions or objections from the supporting parties. At the micro-level, the president needs to take into account the individual motivations of a prospective minister.

This is in regard to the relationship between the president as the mandate delegator and the minister as the mandate recipient. This relationship has the potential to give rise to what Strøm (2000) calls the agency problem. It occurs when the minister acts against the interests of the top executive leadership because they either perform less than expected or deliberately sabotage the president.

Dowding and Dumont (2015) split agency problems into three. The first is agency rent. The minister does not work efficiently and effectively because either the president did not have enough information about the minister’s competence or the minister’s qualifications do not match the mandate received. Or the minister doesn't have the same preference as the president, which leads the former to take the initiative straying from the outlined policies.

The second is adverse selection. The appointed minister does not appear what the president has required. This could be that while the proposed ministers are available, obstacles emerge to make it impossible for high-competent figures to be chosen. The appointment is motivated more by want to fill up the party representation. What may become a concern in a reshuffle is when the president removes a popular minister from the public or removes a competent minister based on the considerations outside the competence factor.

The third is moral hazard. The minister deliberately takes initiatives that are contrary to the president's preferences with the belief that the risks are far lower than the other options. This is motivated by the calculation that the president will provide protection because he or she has prioritized the reputation of the government as a whole. Or the president deliberately lets the minister execute the latter’s own initiatives on the calculation a successful initiative will give a positive image to the government, while in the case of failure, a “scapegoat” is ready for the president to point to.

To mitigate agency problems, Martinez-Gallardo and Schleiter (2014) propose that the president prioritizes non-partisan ministers because politically they have two “bosses”: the president and the party chairman. But in my view, this fact is also very likely to happen to non-partisan ministers who are motivated to build a political career as a minister and/or prepare themselves as officials.

Policy signal

The agency problem is one of the main sources of public criticism of KIM's performance. Therefore, a Cabinet reshuffle also serves as a proxy for the public to detect possible changes in the policy orientation of the Jokowi-Ma'ruf government. There are four issues that can be used as a reference for the policy signal.

First is the perennial issue of the balance between the composition of partisan and non-partisan ministers. If Jokowi wants to maintain legislative support as he now receives, surely the partisan ministerial allocation will not decrease if not increase it. The problem is that the public is aware some partisan ministers fall short of possessing the expertise for the posts.

Related to that, there is an alternative perspective offered by Beckman (2006). Expertise should not be seen only from a professional/educational background. Experienced politicians in the House must also be seen as competent figures. Strengthening legislation in the House can be done without sacrificing too much in terms of competence. This becoming his choice leaves him with the task to communicate this view to the public.

Second is the extent of the reshuffle or the number of ministers replaced and reshuffled. The fewer ministers involved in the reshuffle, the lower the leverage is to jack up public satisfaction with the Cabinet's performance. This happened in the second volume of the reshuffle, which was just tweaking the institutions around by placing the figures from ministries or institutions at the ministerial level.

Third is Jokowi's attitude toward several ministers who are currently tipped to run for the 2024 presidential election, such as Prabowo Subianto, Erick Thohir, Airlangga Hartanto and Sandiaga Uno. Those ministers are in the spotlight because they are suspected of having two agendas in their ministerial work. If they are maintained, this can be interpreted as Jokowi's choice to use a shared space strategy. It can even be interpreted that Jokowi is the one who is pushing them to become the presidential candidates.

Jokowi presupposes a moral hazard situation or agent rent with a predictable or tolerable risk range. At least, these ministers are believed to show concern about making KIM high-performing and, at the same time, also have the motivation to demonstrate their ministerial achievements. This shared space strategy is like an intercropping model: the president's vision is maintained while the minister's achievements are recognized.

Fourth is what are the chances of Jokowi coming up with surprises? Surprises can be in the form of ignoring the status quo regarding the representation of certain ministry posts. This was done when the Education, Culture, Research and Technology Ministry was not allocated for Muhammadiyah’s representative, the Religious Affairs Ministry not for NU and the Health Ministry post going to a non-medical figure.

Another surprise could be the recruitment of prospective presidential or vice presidential figures outside Jokowi’s administration. Related to the need to present a stronger aura of competence, Jokowi may recall former ministers, either during his administration or the era of the previous president to be part of the Cabinet reshuffle.

Anticipation

On paper, a reshuffle serves to promote better performance. However, even before the new ministers can effectively work, the public has already made an assessment of Jokowi's chosen ministers. Therefore, it is crucial for the new ministers to quickly show their performance, at least in the form of small issues that can generate public optimism. The problem is that newly installed ministers need time to adapt to the duties and office personnel. The earlier they prepare or are groomed, the better they will work.

The next anticipation is related to mitigating agency problems. Even if Jokowi chooses a shared space strategy, the agency rent or moral hazard situation still needs to be controlled so that the costs of his policies can be anticipated. One of them is by preparing or renewing the work contracts of the coalition and individual ministers.

Politics is always dynamic and not completely predictable. The old advice remains relevant: prepare an umbrella before it rains.

At the operational stage, there is a need for systematic improvements related to monitoring, synergy and ministry responsiveness. It is important for KIM to improve the approach to policy communication, which seems to have been too political that policy choices are not comprehensively explained. One of the quick wins from this situation is to present a new spokesperson who is specifically tasked with describing the substance of the public policies chosen by the government, instead of being busy getting caught up in the pros and cons of politics related to policies.

And finally, the third reshuffle must be prepared as a foundation to anticipate the next reshuffle. Politics is always dynamic and not completely predictable. The old advice remains relevant: prepare an umbrella before it rains.

KOMPAS/AGUS SUSANTO

Yunarto Wijaya

Yunarto Wijaya, Executive Director of Charta Politika Indonesia

This article was translated by Musthofid.