Consolidation of Civil Society Organizations
We can be certain that such a situation would never be brought about by the Indonesian House because of the nature of the coalition.
In 1998 the authoritarian New Order regime collapsed. Transformations across various fields were carried out and reform began. Although the scale is still being debated, everybody recognizes that in the heart of the transformation and reform were civil society organizations (CSOs) in Indonesia.
Today, after 23 years’ the reform has been underway, how do our CSOs safeguard the state’s continued transformation and reform? Is their role increasingly significant or becoming irrelevant in the dynamism of the era of transition?
This question is important as it seems urgent for us to rethink the progress of our life as a nation and the practice of government power in state administration.
State administrative power
In his article, “Classy on the Outside, Messy on the Inside” (Kompas, 10/11/2021), Buya Syafii Maarif strongly criticized the situation of our state. What looks stylish on the surface turns out to be fragile and broken on the inside. For Buya, this situation stems from the muddled bureaucracy. However, for Bivitri Susanti there is a far more fundamental issue: empty democracy and development policies that marginalize people. This is rooted in the minimum control of the practice of government power because of the small number of factions in the legislature with dissenting views (“In the Name of Development”, Kompas, 11/11/2021).
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Previously, along with two researchers, I made the same argument when analyzing the 2020 regional elections: the government could do anything because the control function that should have been executed by the House of Representatives did not work. The government was supported by the majority of political parties in a “coalition” with 471 seats, while the “opposition” only had 104 seats from the Prosperous Justice Party and the Democratic Party. Yet the two-party opposition was pragmatic rather than ideological as clearly noticed in the regional elections (Nugroho, Kenawas, Syarief, ISEAS Perspective, 25/1/2021).
Everything is formality: no judicial review of the policy to be adopted, no evaluation of policy implementation, let alone any demand for government accountability for its impact.
The consequence was obvious. Whatever the government policy, it would never be challenged by the House as it was all practically supportive. The mechanism of substantive checks and balances fails to operate. Everything is formality: no judicial review of the policy to be adopted, no evaluation of policy implementation, let alone any demand for government accountability for its impact.
Just compare it with, for instance, the United Kingdom. The UK parliament has just written a report, “Coronavirus: Lessons Learned to Date” (12/10/2021), indicating that the mistake of the UK government in the early period of the pandemic by not imposing a lockdown claimed the lives of thousands of victims. Although the vaccination drive was praised as a policy breakthrough, this report affirmed that the deaths could have been avoided. Therefore, Prime Minister Boris Johnson should be held responsible.
We can be certain that such a situation would never be brought about by the Indonesian House because of the nature of the coalition. The government has absolute power to execute almost everything—like tyranny—without correction by the House. As a result, the government-House political ties are strongly marked by the character of self-serving interest.
Here it is important to understand how business intertwines with state power: a number of business players are concurrently political party leaders and seated in the government as policymakers. Consequently, the government’s interest becomes very limited because it is only centered around gaining and maintaining power, by any means and at any cost.In this situation, how should CSOs fathom the situation and assume their stance and position?
Civil space shrinkage
Only two days after President Joko “Jokowi” Widodo expressed his sadness that, as other countries respected Indonesia, many criticisms emerged from domestic circles (Kompas, 11/11/2021), Greenpeace Indonesia was subjected to police action after criticizing the President’s speech on deforestation at the United Nations Climate Change Conference
(COP26) (Kompas, 13/11/2021). Although the case was finally closed, it was an important message that there is always the risk of criminalization for CSOs panning the government.
The Greenpeace case was not the first. Remember the mural resembling Jokowi (Kompas, 27/8/2021) and the criticism aimed at the police (Kompas, 17/10/2021)? Even activists and CSOs dissenting from the government are subject to intimidation, both online (from doxing to persecution) and offline (from physical threats to criminalization). This is not to mention protests, often met with instant belligerence by security personnel (Kompas, 2/ 5/2021).
Their future prospects are also gloomy. For example, the Coordinating Maritime and Investment minister, at odds with several CSOs, has said nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) or CSOs should be audited by the government (Kompas, 17/11/2021). Despite this suggestion being criticized, the attempt will continue to be made to push it through.
This phenomenon is called the shrinking of civic space. It is a situation in which CMOs, an inherent part of society, find it even harder to criticize the practice of power of the ruling authorities, both government and business. Why business? Because the practice of business power also increasingly affects public life: from clothing and food to health and education.
Yet in Indonesia, when business and government powers combine, it is more appropriate to view the phenomenon of the shrinking of civic space in the context of facing the state in government form.
In the beginning of the Covid-19 epidemic, many CMOs criticized the government’s pandemic control and demanded accountability, transparency and data clarity.
The case involving Greenpeace and the intention to audit NGOs serve as a clear example of government pressure although the government form is not always apparent. In the beginning of the Covid-19 epidemic, many CMOs criticized the government’s pandemic control and demanded accountability, transparency and data clarity.
Nevertheless, the criticisms and demands—mostly being conveyed digitally —were seen as antigovernment and treated brutally by supporting buzzers. Although The Economist (2/2/2021) indicated that the “setbacks in democratic freedom” have occurred in nearly all countries, it does not mean that we should just accept it.
Civil society consolidation
There are three clusters of powers forming society: the public or government sector, the market or business sector and the community or civil society (Giddens, 1984).
A healthy society results from the equilibrium of the relationship between the three power clusters. If the government is too dominant, citizens live in an authoritarian state; when business exerts too much power, market fundamentalism becomes the only logic and when community power is at large, people are plagued by communal tribal conflicts and ethnic, religious, racial and intergroup discord (B Herry-Priyono, 2001).
Viewing Indonesia in this perspective, government power is intertwining with — if not dominated by — business power, while the civil society is helpless. As a result, public life is no longer meaningful: oligarchy prevails and removes whatever is preventing their power practice.This is why the consolidation of CSOs is necessary to restore the equilibrium of the government-business-civil society relationship. Still, it cannot be realized if civil societies themselves are not organized. It will certainly have a different impact if only one organization conveyed its criticism or demand to the government or business, compared with that expressed by a coalition of several CSOs, let alone if the criticism or demand is converted into public pressure.
How to do it? First, CSOs should gather to formulate what they are supposed to struggle for, which is the determination and proposal of public cases because that is civil societies’ raison d’ être (reason to be). Some examples are the control of corporate practice through social audit, business accountability, redistribution of welfare, integration of social protection, certainty or basic services like water supply, health, quality education and so forth.
The list can be extended. This is even more important if CSOs are going to oppose the profit accumulating nature of corporations, at the same time facing the repressive authoritarian character of the state.
Second, it is focused on the substance. What is unnecessary is the ritual that turns into empty jargon like declarations, petitions and writing position papers or policy proposals without advocacy. What is needed is a platform to determine where CSOs look to lead to (ecological responsibility, social justice, human rights, democracy and so on) and what they oppose (poverty, injustice, racism, random privatization, consumerism and so on).
Third, it is to identify communities, groups or CSOs at the local and national levels that are engaged in similar issues and contact them.
This consolidation is absolute because the civil space shrinkage in fact is not only caused by government or business pressure but also because civil societies themselves are separated. What happens in government politics,
plagued by self-serving interest, actually also affects civil societies. CSOs meet even more infrequently to hone their ideas and debate their thoughts and approaches, but instead they are more often racing for donors and mutually “dividing” issues.
CSO activists are aware of the tabooed expression, “for me it’s my donor and issue, for you it’s your donor and issue”. This is no longer a secret. But the time has come for a wake-up call for all our CSOs. Unless this is overcome, our civil societies will be even more helpless.
Ideally, CSO donors should also consolidate themselves, instead of focusing on their own interest.
For this reason, resources become the fourth aspect to be considered in the consolidation of civil societies. Ideally, CSO donors should also consolidate themselves, instead of focusing on their own interest.
As Indonesia occupies the Group of 20 (G20) presidency, there is an initiation called the G20 Civil Society (C20): a meeting forum for CSOs from G20 member countries. Global donors will also meet there. This can be the opportunity for consolidation.
Is there any alternative to donors? Yes: state funds. While political parties can now be funded by the state to suppress money politics and hold their accountability, why cannot CSO funding by the state use the same logic? In some developed countries, CSOs receive from state budget and are required to be accountable to their governments. But it is clear that providing funds does not mean controlling them.
Moving ahead
Entering the political election year of 2024, civil societies and CSOs will again be sought and drawn in by those competing for power. And like in previous political elections, CSOs will only be backdrop dancers and cheerleaders if they fail to consolidate themselves into the guardian of public interests.
Such political events make the situation of our CSOs even more intricate.
That is why CSO consolidation is far more important than a mere struggle for power. It is needed to safeguard the aspiration and determination to live a more prestigious life in society. It is because whatever ideals Indonesia strives to achieve for future advancement are impossible to realize by allowing the various aspects of life to be ruined by mutually negating interests.
Yanuar Nugroho, Lecturer, Driyarkara College of Philosophy, Jakarta, Advisor at the Center for Innovation and Police Governance, Visiting Senior Fellow at the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore, Member of the Indonesian Academy of Young Scientists, Deputy II of Chief of Presidential Staff 2015-2019
(This article was translated by Aris Prawira).