It may be that the recentralization trend, which is getting stronger during the administration of President Jokowi, cannot be reversed in the less than 3 years that remain of his presidency.
By
AZYUMARDI AZRA
·5 minutes read
Kompas/Wawan H Prabowo
President Joko Widodo accompanied by Vice President Ma'ruf Amin and Minister of National Development Planning/Head of the National Development Planning Agency Suharso Monoarfa and Minister of Home Affairs Tito Karnavian opened the National Development Planning Consultation (Musrenbangnas) for the 2020-2024 National Medium-Term Development Plan (RPJMN) at the Palace Negara, Jakarta, Monday (16/12/2019).
Recentralization, which can also be called “deautonomization”, seems to be one of the most prominent political and power phenomena of the administration of President Joko “Jokowi” Widodo. After 7 years in power since he was first elected president in 2014, many indicators in his second term, since late 2019, show an increase in the recentralization of power. The central government retracted a number of local administrative powers, resulting in a decline in regional autonomy, which had been fought hard for since independence and only succeeded in the early years of the Reform Era.
The recentralization trend is quite surprising because President Jokowi's political career started in autonomous regions, first as the mayor of Surakarta (2005-2012) and second as the governor of Jakarta (2012-2014). As an official who used to be “unlucky” in the regions, President Jokowi certainly understands and has experienced the ups and downs of regional autonomy vis-a-vis the centralism of the central government.
It may be that the recentralization trend, which is getting stronger during the administration of President Jokowi, cannot be reversed in the less than 3 years that remain of his presidency. From the perspective of regional autonomy, which has been running relatively well since 2005 after the implementation of Law No. 32 /2004 (revised into Law No. 12/2008) on regional administration, recentralization is clearly not in line with the legality of regional autonomy. Therefore, it can be called the “deautonomization” of the region. This phenomenon seems to be part of the Jokowi figure that Ben Bland describes in the title of his book, “Man of Contradictions: Joko Widodo and the Struggle to Remake Indonesia” (2021).
There is no other power in the House that can stem recentralization, whether from the public or civil society. They have all been marginalized.
The recentralization process has increased, mainly through various pieces of legislation that President Jokowi has passed with support from his large political coalition in the House of Representatives. There is no other power in the House that can stem recentralization, whether from the public or civil society. They have all been marginalized.
Kompas/Wawan H Prabowo
Minister of Home Affairs Tito Karnavian talks with Coordinating Minister for Political, Legal and Security Affairs Mahfud MD while attending a limited meeting (Ratas) on the management of rice reserves at the Presidential Office, Jakarta, Wednesday (4/12/2019).
Recentralization has been gaining momentum since 2020. This began with the amendment of Law No. 4/2009 on mineral and coal mining (Minerba) to Law No. 3/2020. This new Minerba Law hands 15 components of regional administration authority over to the central government. Article 4, paragraph 2, for example, requires the central government to take control of minerals and coal from regional administrations, while at the same time eliminating the authority of the provincial and district/city governments to regulate mineral mining.
Recentralization has continued through the passage of Law No. 11/2020 on job creation. This law abolishes a number of components of regional authority, from authority in mining to authority in tax affairs. Regional spatial planning has now been fully taken over by the central government. Bylaws (Perda) must also be in accordance with the Job Creation Law.
Legislation supporting recentralization can also be seen in the amendments to Law No. 21/2001, which was amended by Law No. 35/2008 on Papuan special autonomy to become Law No. 2/2021. In this new Papuan Special Autonomy Law, the central government can “step over” the regional administration and Papuan People's Assembly because it also has the authority to divide provinces and regencies/cities under certain pretexts.
The peak of recentralization will take place in 2022 and will involve the 2024 election of regional heads. Ahead of the 2024 elections, 271 regional heads will have ended their terms of office. By 2022, there will be 7 governors, 76 regents and 18 mayors, and in 2023 there will be 17 governors, 115 regents and 38 mayors who have completed their office terms.
They will be replaced by acting governors, who will be appointed by the President, and acting regents/mayors, who will be appointed by the home affairs minister. Tragically, the elected official (sovereign of the people) has been replaced by the “sovereign” of the central government. It is clear that the recentralization of regional heads adds to Indonesia's democratic regression.
From where regions can now extract such revenue has become a question.
Recentralization through legislation clearly has an impact on the viability and sustainability of local administrations. Many regions have lost local revenue (PAD) from mining minerals and other natural resources. From where regions can now extract such revenue has become a question.
The replacement of regional heads by the President and the Home Affairs Ministry also has the potential to create chaos in the government and regional bureaucracy. This can happen when the acting regional head is not impartial when dealing with political forces or political oligarchs, both in the central government and the regions.
SCREENSHOT VIDEO KEMENTERIAN SOSIAL
Minister of Social Affairs Tri Risma Harini gave an explanation to Vice President Ma'ruf Amin and West Java Governor Ridwan Kamil in Bekasi City, West Java, Thursday (18/02/2021).
Unfortunately, there has been no serious response from the regions to this recentralization or deautonomization. This seems to be because regional heads are busy dealing with the Covid-19 pandemic. It may also be because they are powerless to face large political coalitions, of which most of them are an integral part of in the regions.
All of these developments are a very formidable challenge for advocates of democracy and defenders of regional autonomy.
AZYUMARDI AZRA, Professor of history at UIN Syarif Hidayatullah; AIPI KK member
