New Incarnation of Jamaah Islamiyah

How can the authorities be so sure they are linked to the Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) terrorist group network? Do these arrests not further confirm that the Jokowi regime is suppressing Islamic activists who oppose him?

The arrest of three terrorist suspects in Bekasi on 16 November not only shocked the public, but also raised a number of questions about the dynamics of terrorism in Indonesia.

The three terrorist suspects who "shocked" the public are ZA, a member of the Fatwa Commission of the Indonesian Ulema Council (MUI); FAO, a political party founder who President Jokowi once received at the Palace; and AA, an ustadz (Islamic teacher), who actively preached in the community.

How can the authorities be so sure they are linked to the Jamaah Islamiyah (JI) terrorist group network? Do these arrests not further confirm that the Jokowi regime is suppressing Islamic activists who oppose him? Does this mean that JI has transformed into a new movement that has infiltrated into all walks of life beyond radar detection? Is there a potential solution to this latent danger of JI?

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This public shock is understandable. In their imagination, terrorists are figures who look fierce, rude and have bloodshot eyes as if in the mood to terrorize anyone who stands in their way. They are simply "aliens" who are outside the peace-loving Indonesian community.

Understanding the JI network

Ironically, the public’s imagination of terrorist figures as monsters is justified by depictions of them in the film industry and media reports.

Hannah Arendt, a United States political thinker has dismissed such a notion with the phrase "banality of evil" (1963) or terrorists are "ordinary human figures" just like us.

For Arendt, there is no specific terrorist DNA, nor is there a distinctly specific profile of a terrorist figure. Old, young, male, female, rich, poor, religious or non-religious people can all potentially commit evil, like acts of terror.

It is altogether wrong to perceive that JI is a purely terrorist organization. Facts on the ground show JI's movement is almost no different from other religious-based organizations, such as Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), Muhammadiyah, the Indonesian Bishops' Conference, the Fellowship of Churches in Indonesia, Parisada Hindu Dharma Indonesia and the Indonesian Buddhist Council.

In other words, to some extent, JI as an organization moves to help its members in their social lives. In fact, JI also provides social services to the public in general.

However, this has not necessarily justified that JI is a moderate organization.

At the time of the Mount Merapi eruption, JI members joined the humanitarian movement by helping the community regardless of their religious background. However, this has not necessarily justified that JI is a moderate organization.

JI is narrow-minded in understanding “jihad”. It believes it is permissible to use arbitrary violence to achieve its political goals. So, even though they are “ordinary people” like us, they will turn to a militaristic-style approach to fight for its political agenda. The fire of hatred against the regime will always be cultivated because the regime is not implementing Islamic law.

Provided with community services offered by JI, some often feel unaware they are drifting into becoming part of the JI culture. It would be wrong to suggest that the ideology of violence was the main motivation behind people joining JI.

One of the community services JI actively works on is in the field of education. Today, JI has no less than 150 educational institutions, which have been established to cater to the needs of the community from all walks of life, from orphans and the underprivileged to women and the upper middle class. They also hold childcare facilities.

The educational programs include kindergarten, elementary school, junior high school, senior high school and higher education. They are scattered across Sumatra, Java, Sulawesi, Kalimantan, Ambon, NTB and Bima, with thousands of “beneficiaries”.

JI's new strategy

Through this educational path, one of the arrested JI figures (ZA) was recruited. While being known as an intellectual and humble figure, ZA received scholarships for his bachelor’s (S-1) in Medina, master’s (S-2) and PhD (S-3) in Egypt.

It can be said that ZA is the JI cadre trainee in the world of education. He was not sent to Afghanistan for military training like others.

With his academic record, ZA was expected to polish JI into a widely acceptable organization in the community. This strategy is called "tamkin", an Arabic term that means “territorial control” or “control of influence” in social, political, economic and even cultural aspects.

For his role, ZA was installed in JI's da'wah division.

With such a large mandate, it was natural that when ZA returned to Indonesia, it was difficult for him to break away from the JI social network. For his role, ZA was installed in JI's da'wah division.

According to the rules of the JI organization, the da'wah division should not interact with members of the jihad division such as JI war commander Zulkarnaen.

He was the first Afghan alumnus to have met world jihad figures, such as Dr Abdullah Azzam from Palestine. Zulkarnain was arrested in Lampung in December 2020.

It is at this point that the public is stunned by the JI movement, which shows a pattern of two opposing faces. The first face is "da'wah", in which JI members are very adept at embracing the wider community.

KOMPAS/RADITYA HELABUMI

Activists write messages during a demonstration against the repatriation of around 600 Indonesians who joined the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (NIIS) militia at the Taman Pandang Palace area of the National Monument, Jakarta, Monday (10/2/2020).

The second face is "jihad". In this case, JI members are obliged to defend the people whom they see are under oppression at the national level, as seen in the Ambon and Poso conflicts, or at the international level, such as in Afghanistan, Philippines (Moro), Myanmar, Syria and Iraq.

To ensure that these two missions work well, JI sees it crucial to find a large source of funds. Under the control of the new JI leader, Parawijayanto, who is also a former human resources development manager at a top company in Central Java, JI has transformed into a company-like organization.

JI has a business in oil palm plantations, fisheries and other business ventures as well as charity boxes. Almost the whole of JI's business chain has been detected by [counterterrorism police detachment] Densus 88.

Densus 88 believes that JI still possesses weapons and explosives that will one day be used when JI feels ready for a confrontation with the authorities.

"This is the implementation of their concept of 'jihad' which endangers state security," said a senior figure from Densus 88 in an interview.

JI's transformation

The national security forces' concerns are well-founded. Having fought terror threats in Indonesia for nearly 20 years, with the arrests of more than 2,000 terrorists, the security authorities have a large list of terrorist inmates, around 800 of whom are affiliated with JI.

It speaks enough of JI's well worked out regeneration. However, this large network does not necessarily mean there have been no efforts by JI's internal circle or those who in the past had contact with JI to ideologically straighten the understanding of Islam’s message of “rahmatan lil’alamin” [a mercy to all humankind] through a democratic reconciliation path.

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Actually, this process is nothing new. US political expert John Ishiyama edited a book with a very apt title to view this phenomenon, From Bullets to Ballots: The Transformation of Rebel Groups into Political Parties (2017).

AFP/LOUAI BESHARA

Syrians walk in front of a poster of President Bashar al-Assad near the Grand Umayyad Mosque in Damascus on September 23, 2021.

Perhaps, it is in this context that FAO, a figure referred to by the police as being among the members of the shura council or JI advisory council, was in the process of carrying out a "transformation" within JI by establishing the Republic of Indonesia Da'wah Party (PDRI).

For FAO, the narrative of the clandestine or underground struggle motivated by anger and hatred toward opponents needed to change to a narrative on the ground that was firm, straightforward, diplomatic and without hatred.

FAO is not a pushover figure in the world of Islamic activists. He has a wide network not only in Indonesia, but also in the Middle East. It is because one of the Islamic organizations FAO is affiliated with is the Indonesian Islamic Da'wah Council (DDII), which was founded by former Indonesian prime minister Muhammad Nasir.

Unfortunately, while he was in the process of moderating JI, the security authorities saw FAO contravening Law No. 5/2018 on terrorism eradication, by becoming a member of the JI advisory council, hiding information on the wanted fugitives (DPO) and illegally raising funds for the interest of JI.

In the future, prisons in Indonesia will be filled with JI leaders, both from the executive and advisory board. Those are what their supporters refer to on social media as “ulema [scholars] who endeavor for the ummah [community], but face persecution from the Jokowi regime”.

The incarceration period is the right time for the state to encourage an internal dialogue among JI figures for possible disbandment of the JI military division with the expected concrete steps to hand over the weapons and explosives.

If this happens, it will be similar to the process of the Egyptian JI’s organizational de-radicalization or “collective de-radicalization” (Ashour 2019).

Collective de-radicalization

JI's collective de-radicalization efforts must be a priority for the authorities to include in the budget of the National Development Planning Agency (Bappenas). It will crucially help accelerate our nation-building process. One program that needs to be encouraged in this context is to dissect the literature narrative used by JI, such as the book titled Materi Taklimat Islamiyah (MTI).

There are many stages that an individual must go through, such as fighting self-lust, before going to war.

Abu Fida, a senior JI thinker who met Osama bin Laden in Afghanistan in the 1980s and completed his studies in Saudi Arabia, said “Understanding jihad as qital (war) is not a mistake, but narrows the meaning of jihad. There are many stages that an individual must go through, such as fighting self-lust, before going to war.”

The state can encourage JI figures, like Abu Fida, to write more to make internal corrections on JI’s misleading literature. The written discourses can later be brought up in a discussion presenting former JI members who have vowed loyalty to the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia (NKRI), such as Umar Patek, Ali Fauzi, Machmudi Hariono, Ali Imron and Jack Harun.

This will add up the more pacifying literature Abu Fida has initiated. After the revision, internal insights can be further discussed before NU and Muhammadiyah leaders to get new input. The final result of the discussion can be made the source for the final revised interpretation of MTI.

This new revised MTI book can then be used as reading material for JI members in prison. Having built a comprehension over the book, they will discuss the contents of the book with someone like Abu Fida, who is ready with “new ammunition”.

KOMPAS/DANU KUSWORO

Noor Huda Ismail

Such a process must also be carried out across all JI educational institutions throughout Indonesia. The students of the JI educational institution are those among the young generation that should be viewed as assets of Indonesia's nation-building process.

Such an inclusive measure, by embracing them in literature narrative dialog, seems to bear far cheaper political and social costs compared one that would uproot all elements of JI in our country with a zero sum game approach.

Noor Huda Ismail, Visiting Fellow RSIS, NTU Singapore

(This article was translated by Musthofid).