Jokowi: Between Legacy and Second-term Curse
Having a legacy is one thing, but how it will be understood is something different. Jokowi should also pay attention to the innermost feelings of society, not merely focusing on the legacy of physical achievements.
Didie SW
When the world was overwhelmed by the Covid-19 pandemic, President Joko “Jokowi” Widodo seemed to be faced with the “myth” of the second-term curse.
His various plans and big ambitions were interrupted, with the attempt to build his legacy seemingly blocked by a high wall in front of him.
Almost two years of Jokowi’s second term have been burdened with the problem of pandemic mitigation. The first six months were the most difficult. Surveys by Charta Politika and other agencies like SMRC and Indikator Politik indicated a downturn in the public evaluation of the government’s performance in general, though not as low as early in the first term. However, soon afterward, the public evaluation tended to improve, though not yet reaching the approval ratings of the period before the Covid-19 pandemic.
On the other hand, despite the negative public opinion on household and national economic conditions, the public has remained optimistic about the economic prospects for the coming year. In can be concluded that during the pandemic, even with signs of increased dissatisfaction, in general the level of approval of the Jokowi-Amin government has remained positive. This obviously constitutes political capital. The question is, will this be adequate enough to face the so-called “second-term curse”?
Strengthening foothold
The second term ideally serves as a big opportunity. As there is no more nomination, the incumbent is no longer bothered by the issue of how to win the next general elections. The government’s ranks are also already experienced so that it is easier to make resolute decisions (Abbott et al., 2020).
Jokowi seems to be aware of this opportunity. It is no wonder then, that in his victory speech he described himself as having no more burden. This message suggested that in his second term, Jokowi would prioritize policies that might not be popular in the eyes of the public but were considered very important, instead of executing policies desired by voters. Certainly, this strategy was not rigid. Jokowi is like a pendulum, which will swing to prevent the building of negative sentiment against his government.
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Jokowi’s courage to go against the flow surely did not come overnight. The first period was a valuable experience. Former United States president Bill Clinton is considered the president who enjoyed the greatest benefits from the political experience of his first term compared with his predecessors (Nelson, 1998). This is almost the same as what has happened to Jokowi. The political furor and experience in serving as a minority government – both in the Jakarta administration and in the early first term of his presidency – provided the grounding for Jokowi to understand the political constellations, the behavior of the political and business elite, the bureaucratic practice as well as the tendency of voters’ behavior.
Because of this experience, Jokowi apparently realizes that he has no way of satisfying everybody. More than that, he is aware of the need to compromise more than he should. Political transfer is inevitable. This is done by activating executive key tools. Chaisty et al. (2012) divide the executive key tools into five categories: agenda power (the legislative power given to the president, decrees), budgetary authority (control over public expenditure), cabinet management (ministerial seat distribution), partisan powers (presidential influence on one or more coalition parties) and informal institutions (other categories according to the context of each country).
Yet political transfer alone is not enough. Jokowi realizes that it is impossible to fulfill all his political pledges. Therefore, he has given up some of them to allow his priority policies to proceed. Seen in a different way, it can be said that in this second period, Jokowi “indulges” his political preferences oriented toward the economy and political stability, though it is paid with the perception of a general setback in democracy, especially among activists of rights and democracy.
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The first significant maneuver that caused such a perception was the involvement of Prabowo Subianto as a member of his cabinet. Jokowi was aware that this political stance would frustrate some of his voters. He also understood that Prabowo’s voters were not going to readily turn into government supporters. But this was the political move needed to make sure he would no longer be held hostage by the House of Representatives as had happened in the first half of his first-term presidency, at the same time anticipating any likely maneuver by the government’s supporting parties.
The choice of forming a big coalition actually was once considered speculative. This evaluation primarily used the example of the failure of the huge coalition set up by Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono in his second term. His coalition partners at the time, especially the Golkar Party and the Prosperous Justice Party, just frequently bombarded his government. The big coalition supporting the Jokowi-Amin government has unexpectedly maintained relatively high coalition discipline in the House. This was proven by the successful passage of the Job Creation Law and the Tax Regulation Harmonization Law.
Mitigation possible
Nevertheless, the next three years will remain a difficult journey for Jokowi-Amin. Jokowi will continue to face the typical situations and challenges of the second period of presidency. Nelson, in 1998, mentions at least three factors that hamper an incumbent’s greater success compared with their first period: the legacy of problems or policies in the first term, the absence of the “honeymoon” period with the media and public and the situation of being a lame duck government.
Based on a historical study of United States presidencies, Crockett (2008) identifies four factors that leads to a difficult final term: post-election arrogance, personnel fatigue, particularly when faced with the demand to make better achievements than those in the first period, “empty campaigns” and also leadership failure, among others, caused by the political stance in the first term. In the last three years of Jokowi’s second term, the biggest challenge he will face is the potential to be a lame duck president.
As indicated by Johnson in his 1986 paper, there are various situations attached to this term. Originally, this term referred to the transitional period when the incumbent loses in elections but remains in office until the president-elect is installed. This term also related to the transitional period when the incumbent president announces not to contest for the next period or is not eligible for renomination. Later this term was even used for the entire second term of Ronald Reagan’s presidency.
In the case of Jokowi, this terminology refers to the condition when political parties, legislators, the media, some cabinet members and presidential supporting staff are already more preoccupied with matters of 2024 presidential election. It is a kind of a “premature-election” situation. The orientation to the next elections is natural and thus inevitable. But this will be a stumbling block for the Jokowi government as he encounters three challenges, his supporting coalition splitting or their discipline slackening, his cabinet members busily maneuvering and his supporting staff preparing to find their next “boat”.
The impact of “premature elections” cannot be denied, but it does not mean that it cannot be mitigated. This can be done, firstly, by personnel restructuring. As the level of satisfaction declines, Jokowi can play the cabinet reshuffle card. Although political transfer in the form of ministerial seat allocation should go to supporting parties, Jokowi needs to negotiate in order to secure the best figures from the respective parties. If necessary, additional political transfer can be made, like heads of agencies, to compensate for the choice of certain figures from the parties.
Jokowi can fill the positions of deputy minister that are, at present, mostly absent in several ministries. These deputies are made ready to support the duties of ministers and also at the same time standing by in case the ministers resign and or withdrawn by their political parties.
As a complement, Jokowi needs to consider refreshing his supporting staff members, including those in the ad hoc bodies he has formed, especially figures that have become burdensome and or are no longer working wholeheartedly for the Jokowi government. The presence of new figures will serve as an opportunity to present new ideas or breakthroughs. This is because new figures are relatively unaffected by the political fatigue syndrome or are not becoming stubborn following an accumulation of seven-years’ experience in the Jokowi presidency.
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Jokowi should also prepare personnel to fill 271 posts of regional heads that will be vacant in 2022 and 2023 because of the enforcement of simultaneous regional elections in 2024. Regional head positions are important to realize deconcentration and secondment duties and keep public services and regional development active. In this case, Jokowi needs to make sure that the command is in his hands so as not to give the impression of dualism of loyalty. But at the same time this post filling should pay attention to political propriety in order to prevent any resistance to these regional heads.
Second, Jokowi needs to speed up priority regulations so they are ready in 2022. Otherwise, Jokowi will meet difficulties as in 2023 the House will be busily “handling” the 2024 general elections, or the coalition will have divided. In such a situation, the attempt to get policies and regulations passed will be far harder or politically more costly.
While involvement in investment and infrastructure are his priorities, Jokowi should consider preparing an omnibus law to accelerate bureaucratic reform. This includes the restructuring of state auxiliary agencies like the Ombudsman, the Business Competition Supervisory Commission (KPPU), the Public Information Commission (KIP), the General Elections Commission (KPU), the Human Rights National Commission (Komnas HAM), the Judicial Commission and the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK), which are now working separately. No less important is to prepare a new legal umbrella for acting regional heads. Otherwise, there will be a situation like the lame duck government at the regional level. Many implications will arise and, unless anticipated, have the potential to hamper the priority agenda of the Jokowi-Amin government.
Landscape design of the new nation's capital in East Kalimantan. Landscape design of the new nation's capital in East Kalimantan. The giant project is touted as President Joko Widodo's big plan and ambition to leave a legacy,
Third, political capital needs to be preserved. This is because the “premature elections” scenario has the potential to erode Jokowi’s reputation. Reporting often adopts a “horse racing” style, with the media focusing more on potential candidates than on Jokowi and his government. In this context, the communication actions of candidates will most likely erode Jokowi’s charisma. This is a serious issue because the satisfaction level with the Jokowi government’s performance so far has been contributed by the public’s partisan attitude and Jokowi’s personal charisma.
Apart from ensuring economic performance, the Jokowi administration should prepare Covid-19 mitigation in a more comprehensive manner than previously. Although it has been relatively under control, the situation ahead remains vague. The stagnant vaccination acceleration in the US, the case spikes in Singapore and currently in Europe indicate that the controlled conditions can undergo a rapid 180-degree reversal.
If the pandemic rapidly worsens again, Jokowi’s government will face greater pressure choosing a stricter social restriction policy. The survey findings of Charta Politika and Indikator Politik, for instance, display a shift in voters’ preference. Now the support for social restriction policies such as large-scale social restrictions (PSBB) or public activity restrictions (PPKM) is no longer as strong as it was in the first six months of the pandemic.
At the same time, the Jokowi government has not yet found an effective formula to encourage strict compliance with health protocols. The realization of vaccinations shows continued interprovincial disparity. As a result, the government also has difficulty in promoting booster vaccinations even if vaccine stocks are available.
In other words, the Jokowi government will have an old but new problem: wishing to speedily shift from the pandemic situation to the endemic, but having inadequate capacity and resources to realize it. This situation is like a fast runner with one foot carrying a heavy load.
Other political capital comes from the political will of Jokowi to at least keep the deficit in democracy from further increasing. This deserves due attention because public permissiveness has its limit. If this threshold is penetrated, the public can be provoked by just one or two events of social injustice, discrimination or religious sentiment.
Political capital is a valuable currency not only to enter the next three years’ complex and ambiguous political dynamism, but also to at least equal the success of the first period.
Yunarto Wijaya
As president, Jokowi inevitably has ambition to be remembered for his monumental accomplishments. This is only natural in politics. What should be noted is that the narrative of his legacy can be sounded out from this moment. But, as time goes by, the narration is likely to receive divided interpretations or opposite perception.
Having a legacy is one thing, but how it will be understood is something different. Therefore, Jokowi should also pay attention to the innermost feelings of society, not merely focusing on the legacy of physical achievements.
Yunarto Wijaya, Executive Director of Charta Politika Indonesia
This article was translated by Aris Prawira.
