The shift from the New Order to the Reform era did not make the posture and scope of the country slimmer; in fact, it became fatter, with mediocre human resources.
By
YUDI LATIF
·5 minutes read
The COVID-19 pandemic has exposed the weaknesses and strengths of our sociopolitical system. With the posture and scope of state intervention that is so large and wide, the capacity of government agencies to deal with this disaster appears to be ineffective; so much so that the President had to overhaul the ad hoc committee to cover up the inertia.
On the other hand, this pandemic also shows the strength of the Indonesian people’s social capital. The Charity Aid Foundation (CAF), the 2021 World Giving Index, with its survey that is closely related to the pandemic situation, once again named Indonesia as the country with the most generous people in the world. Unfortunately, political governance and state policies have so far relied too much on the role of the state and at the same time, waste the people’s power and the role of the healthy market.
In fact, in a pandemic situation that requires speed of action, the handling — such as a vaccination program — is still heavily bureaucratized; even after the situation got out of control, there was the tendency to expand the role of communities and markets.
The shift from the New Order to the Reform era did not make the posture and scope of the country slimmer; in fact, it became fatter, with mediocre human resources. There is the confusion of differentiating between the "coverage" and "strength" of the state; between the scope of state functions and the capacity of state institutions to enforce rules and policies. In fact, as Francis Fukuyama pointed out, a country with a broad scope of intervention does not necessarily have the ability, and is often powerless, to create and enforce laws and policies. On the other hand, a state with a limited scope of roles may have the ability to enforce laws and policies optimally and strongly. In other words, the strength of the state is not seen from the extent of its roles and functions, but rather from the capacity and effectiveness of its institutions.
We have to really look at the weaknesses in this state governance because no country can develop well without the accuracy and capacity of governance. Daron Acemoglu and James A Robinson in Why Nations Fail conclude that the key difference between developed and underdeveloped countries lies in their socioeconomic institutions, which provide different incentives to individuals and businesses and in turn depend on their political, legal and policy institutional regimes. Political stability and long-term prosperity require the state to first organize its political institutions well.
Good state governance must be able to provide a balance between the roles of the state, market and communities. Leading a government, especially in a democratic system, should not be carried out by “rowing”, which requires the large muscles of the state. It is enough to just "navigate" by activating all roles, functions and agencies in a participatory and coordinative manner.
The obesity of Indonesian state bureaucracy not only drains the state budget for routine expenses, which must be met by foreign debt, it is also less able to dynamize the creative power of the community and market. We need directives and road maps to streamline the country and that gradually lead to a limited but strong government. Strong does not mean tyrannical but effective in enforcing law, policy and order. The role of the state is more limited, especially in protecting citizens from threats of violence and harm, enforcing contracts, building citizens’ capabilities through education and health, developing technological-innovation institutions, building infrastructure and pursuing distributive and intergenerational justice.
The reorganization of the state does not have to go through radical changes, deprived of all good legacies from the past. Every innovation requires stability, and every productive stability requires the continuity of the good elements of the past. The problem of Indonesia\'s political infantility is caused by the inability to accumulate the good traditions of each government.
It should be realized that reducing the scope of state involvement will not automatically make state governance more effective. Policymakers often do not have the anticipatory power that in the process of reducing the scope of the country, most developing countries can face new, more complicated problems. This could be a weakening of state power or the need for new types of state capabilities that are not yet available or are still very weak. In addition, the efforts to restructure the role of the state also cannot be patchy because it can create a paradoxical situation that can negate each other.
Therefore, a measurable choice is needed to decide from where to start the change. In this case, it is good to hear the confession of Milton Friedman (2002), an orthodox expert, on free market economy. Friedman said that until a decade ago, he had only three words for a country transitioning from socialism: privatization, privatization and privatization.
"However, I was wrong," he said. “I changed my mind that strengthening the rule of law might be more basic than privatization.”
Increasing the capacity of the state to plan and execute policies, as well as enforce the law in a firm, clean and transparent manner, along with improving the quality of people\'s representatives and the state institutions that oversee them, is a necessary prerequisite in the framework of streamlining the role of the state.
YUDI LATIF, National Alliance Expert
(This article was translated byKurniawan Siswoko).