Bureaucratic Supervision 2021
The governance of our public sector has been marked by a “triple gap” for years. A sound policy is one thing, while implementation can be another.
The governance of our public sector has been marked by a “triple gap” for years. A sound policy is one thing, while implementation can be another. And, what\'s more, there is another issue related to law enforcement or administrative supervision on the field.
Regarding the third “gap”, generally the bureaucrats at the central and regional levels still underestimate the role of supervision. Some parties are often “allergic” to oversight. They don\'t want to be supervised. If possible, they try to outsmart, even "flirt" with the oversight agencies, such as the inspectorate, external supervisory commission or the financial audit body.
All this not only contaminates the whole structure of the bureaucracy and supervisory institutions, but also results in losses to the people. Administrative failure, inefficiency and corruption have become a "trinity" of pathologies that undermine the quality of public services, fiscal management and others.
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In fact, supervision is designed as an instrument to create accountability and to trigger feedback for further improvements. Policy or service administrators need to improve their performance based on the findings of other parties who are outside or above them. Although oversight is synonymous with supervision, its beneficial contribution is more as protection and promotion of future governance.
The measure of success does not lie in control and sanctions, but there is a deterrent effect and correction in order to be more accountable in caring for the people.
Leverage point
On the other hand, the ecosystems and the chain of monitoring processes have their own problems. The mandate of authority, institutional design and the quality and power of execution have been a weak point.
Similarly, instead of being a role model, the people in charge of oversight also get the "diseases" similar to those of the agencies
being supervised so that they also need to be supervised. Furthermore, we can still add to the layers of other generic problems, all of which need to be seriously assessed in paving the way for change.
First, in contrast to law enforcement agencies or financial auditors that have strong positions, supervisory agencies are generally relatively powerless.
Whether it is in the form of an ad hoc commission or as a state institution, its non-structural status (LNS) seems to "throw" out of the organic part of the mainstream agencies. Their formation during the transition to democracy marks their temporary-ness (prone to being blocked/liquidated) or complementarity (complementary), making their existence or inexistence less crucial in determining the quality of the mainstream state agencies.
Second, in terms of authority, the supervisory agency is "full of power" on the input and process side, but its output and execution power are weak. The Indonesian Ombudsman, for example. The state institution that has the authority to supervise public services is equipped with various working modalities: subpoena-power, immunity rights, investigation authority and so on.
However, the output of all of this is a (merely) recommendation. The fate of its execution is determined by another party. In a bureaucratic culture, political commitment and system that has not been solid, the clause "it must comply with Ombudsman Indonesia recommendations" looks fierce at first glance. But part of its realization is just like a paper tiger.
Third, the supervisory architecture is not only characterized by many institutions, but they also tend to overlap. We are familiar with the nomenclature of internal and external supervision, inherent and functional supervision, technical and political oversight, and so on.
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The basis for the formation of a number of agencies is not always based on functions or a chain of process approach, but based on political calculations or institutional motivations when regulations are being drawn up. Within the strong ego (silo mentality) of the officials/institutions, fragmentation and contestation then burst out.
All of these conditions resonate in work movement, responsiveness and effectiveness of supervision.
Fourth, the management of internal performance is generally characterized by institutions and service arrangements that have not yet ideal. The classic issues still revolve around financial support, work infrastructure, formation and quality of human resources (HR), to the model of the relationship between the head office and representatives in the regions. All of these conditions resonate in work movement, responsiveness and effectiveness of supervision. Weak leadership and internal governance exacerbate institutional carrying capacity in channelling the benefits for the community.
The script of the Grand Design of Bureaucratic Reform (2010-2025) and the 2020-2024 Bureaucratic Reform Road Map in the second term of Joko Widodo\'s administration put the supervisory element as one of the arenas for public sector changes.
However, with so many work agendas being prepared, the reform strategy seems to have lost focus because it does not start from a strategic lever/change point. The implication is that after 10 years of the second wave of bureaucratic reform, until the beginning of 2021 we are still struggling with unchecked practices of maladministration, inefficiency and bureaucratic corruption.
In my opinion, we have to pull the knot from back to front. The end of the chain of a monitoring process is bureaucratic compliance and public satisfaction. The difference of whether the outcome of a supervision is followed up or neglected lies in the power of execution.
Supervision of the merit system (Commission of State Civilian Apparatus, KASN), public services (Ombudsman of the Republic of Indonesia, ORI), information disclosure (Central Information Commission, KIP) and so on will only result in corrections for improvement of performance and accountability if their work is converted into high execution power.
First, it starts from the internal supervisory institution, namely the existence of a resolution and monitoring unit. This unit ensures the follow-up of the results of supervision, assists in formulating the appropriate response from the party being supervised and formulates a tracking policy to measure the impact of decisions/recommendations for related policy changes.
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The measure of success is clearly different from that of the researcher, nor is being complacent as a watchdog, in which the work ends in media reports and news. The standard of success for supervisors is the improvement as a result of their work.
Second, supervisory agencies generally play in the domain of influence (magistrature of influence), not magistrature of sanctions like law enforcers. To be influential, the institution and its leading figures must be influential. However, without borrowing a hand (synergy) with an institution that has authority, this influence can be fruitless. In the bureaucratic structure there is an inspectorate that has work groups similar to the Ombudsman or KASN.
Meanwhile, for regional administrations that do not heed the results of supervision, synergy with the Ministry of Home Affairs is clearly very crucial as the supervisory authority (binwas) which is equipped with sanctions.
Their support will become an energy of change if it is treated substantively, manifesting through partisanship and performance for the public good.
Third, in the macro ecosystem, social support (community) and political support (House of Representatives, DPR) is the ultimate key. From the view of external supervisors, the genealogy of the birth of various commissions as well as those that evolved into state agencies grew from an intention to become a reality in public sector governance. Their support will become an energy of change if it is treated substantively, manifesting through partisanship and performance for the public good.
On the other hand, political communication with the House (DPR)/Regional Legislative Council (DPRD) must be established intensively. The results of oversight of one sector/field can be used as the basis for working meeting or hearing with relevant commissions at the House or for controlling the work of ministries/agencies (in central government) and offices (in local administrations).
The headlines of the mass media these days present a contrast: a declining corruption perception index and a re-evaluation of the existence of KASN. The public finds it difficult to understand it. Corruption usually stems from our failure to prevent maladministration and enforce a merit system (qualification, competence and performance) in personnel management.
The role of supervision is actually to contain in the upstream, as a preemptive and preventive effort, before the damage occurs. Moreover, during the Covid-19 pandemic, when the relaxation of public sector governance during 2020 cannot be tolerated this year and next (Jaweng, Kompas, 19/1/2021).
Also read: Corruption Emergency
A complete strategy for dealing with corruption should put supervision at the core of the prevention efforts. Integrity systems are built and supervisory institutions must ensure the system works.
The political dimension in this work scheme acts to ensure systematic institutional arrangements and the strength of support for its existence as well as its full operation. This effort clearly cannot be left to the bureaucracy.
Not only as an object of supervision, especially because there is no history, this supervision has been welcomed in a friendly manner for the good of the public (accountability) and themselves (performance improvement).
Robert Na Endi Jaweng, RI Ombudsman Commissioner, KPPOD Foundation Management
(This article was translated by Kurniawan Siswoko).