The Need for Political Reform in Corruption Prevention
In theory, the democratic political system in fact constitutes a concept that minimizes corruption. Why?
The democratic political system that has been developing rapidly since the resignation of President Suharto in 1998 is a product of, among others, widespread public opposition to the practice of corruption, collusion and nepotism (KKN) that was rampant under the New Order authoritarian regime.
After more than two decades, however, instead of seeing a decline, corruption has only been spreading to involve not only those in the government’s ranks, but also the legislature and judiciary at both the central and regional levels. The mounting calls for democracy are directly proportional to the escalating crime of corruption. The question then rises as to why the increasingly open and democratic system has not contributed significantly to the development of clean government and the emergence of public officials that possess high degrees of integrity and accountability.
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What has gone wrong? The factors that contribute to corruption in our country are extremely complex, ranging from the legacy of the authoritarian and centralistic system, to piecemeal institutional reform, to the institutionalization of a patrimonial bureaucratic culture, and to society’s permissive attitude towards money politics and corruption. This is not to mention that the civil service salary system offers relatively low remuneration, which can prompt them to commit corruption. No less important is the management and/or administrative system of state finances that still offer some room and opportunities for corruption, as well as the weak supervisory and law enforcement systems.
This article focuses primarily on the management of politics and our democracy over the two decades since the New Order, and is based on the writer’s subjective assumption that corruption in our country actually has its roots in politics. It is politics that is corrupt and left fundamentally uncorrected, inclined towards the personal and oligarchic, as well as involves democratic practices that deny the imperative establishment of a system of checks and balances between the branches of political power, both vertically and horizontally.
Democracy and corruption
In theory, the democratic political system in fact constitutes a concept that minimizes corruption. Why? This is because the concept of democracy allows for power to be distributed, rather than for power to be centralized as in an authoritarian system. In addition, power is also executed transparently in a democracy because of the mechanism of control vested in the elected representatives of the people, by the public through a free press and an independent civil society, as well as an effective system of checks and balances between branches of power.
Although our democratic system meets all these requirements, this fulfillment is merely formal and procedural. The general elections and regional elections, conducted in a free and democratic way, have produced only those public representatives and officials that have political party backing. But it should be noted that almost no system of political recruitment exists that is open, democratic and accountable. Neither does a recruitment system exist as yet that is based on an inclusive, periodical, hierarchical and sustainable system of political regeneration. As a result, the candidates with popularity, financial capital and personal-nepotistic ties with party executives become the subjective choices in the nomination process, rather than those candidates who possess the capabilities, competence and commitment to improve the lives of the people as a whole.
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On the other hand, a culture of opposition has not been particularly nurtured to support the establishment of a system of checks and balances between the branches of power. Nearly all political parties in the House are in a race to join the executive branch, so some policies have escaped criticism and fundamental corrections. This political reality has impacted democratic practices so they are controlled more by oligarchic interests than the people’s aspirations.
In brief, the democratic system that has been developing rapidly since 1999 has not yet contributed significantly to quality improvement of the accountability and integrity of the political elite, nor to good governance. The general and regional elections are more free and direct, but money politics and corruption are still rampant and have shown a widening trend. Political power has been distributed horizontally to the regions and more towards decentralization, but the level of accountability at nearly all levels of government has not really improved. Upholding the supremacy of the law was believed to protect democracy and prevent power from becoming mired in or being distorted by corruption, but this has fallen short of expectations.
Unsurprisingly, Indonesia has been categorized as a flawed democracy in the Democracy Index compiled by the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) over the last few years. The EIU uses five variables to measure the state of democracy in a country: (1) electoral process and pluralism, (2) functioning of government, (3) political participation, (4) political culture, and (5) civil liberties. Indonesia ranks even below Timor Leste, Malaysia and the Philippines, but it ranks above Singapore.
Reform of general and regional elections
General and regional elections that are merely free, democratic and direct have no meaning if they tend to produce poor governance and public officials that are corrupt and elitist. The elections need continuous reform and improvement in terms of the electoral system and/or the electoral format towards minimizing the potential for corruption by public officials and to maximize the maintenance of good, clean and corruption-free government management. One of the required measures is to prevent the general elections, particularly the legislative elections, from being a political process that incurs high costs.
High-cost politics also occurs when legislative candidates buy votes prior to an election.
Since the political parties yet to institutionalize an open, democratic and accountable recruitment process, the legislative candidates that have a bigger chance at being elected are those who enjoy popularity and possess sufficient financial capital. High-cost politics also occurs when legislative candidates buy votes prior to an election. A book by Edward Aspinall and Ward Berenschot, Democracy for Sale: Elections, Clientelism, and the State in Indonesia (2019), and another title by Burhanuddin Muhtadi, Kuasa Uang (The Power of Money, 2020), confirm the prevalence of money politics during the general and regional elections.
High-cost politics occurs in the regional elections when not all political parties can nominate a candidate because they do not meet the legislative threshold of securing at least 20 percent of the total seats or 25 percent of the vote for political parties/ party coalitions. As a result, political transactions occur in trading seats and/or votes between candidates, or in deals to support and nominate political parties as a form of “political dowry”. Finally, candidates seek financial support from individual sponsors or businesspeople, who certainly expect the candidates to award them lucrative projects after they have been elected.
According to a restricted research by the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK, 2017), the political costs incurred for regent/mayoral and gubernatorial candidate pairs ranged from Rp 20 billion to Rp 100 billion. It is no wonder that most candidates need to seek sponsorship, mostly from businesspeople, to fund their candidacy. The most common methods used in the majority of the KPK’s bribery and corruption cases involving regional heads confirms this: a previous “arrangement” of project tenders in exchange for gifts/promises/bribes from businesspeople.
Therefore, in the framework for reforming the legislative elections, it is necessary to consider a shift to the closed list system of proportional representation, because the current open list system tends to facilitate widespread money politics. The open list system of proportional representation also distances elected representatives from the aspirations of both their constituencies and their own parties. The other alternative is to adopt the parallel system, a mixed electoral system that combines proportional representation and a majoritarian (district) voting system, a suggestion that was raised in a 2013 study by the Indonesian Institute of Sciences (LIPI).
Apart from the need to change the electoral system, the state should obligate political parties to institutionalize the open, democratic and accountable recruitment system so that candidates and people’s representatives who are competent, have good track records and a strong national commitment will be elected.
The strict nomination threshold requirement should be considered for possible annulment or relaxation so that not only the public will have more choices of candidate pairs, but the transaction of support between political parties will also be minimized. The phenomenon of increasing appearance of sole candidates ahead of the 2020 simultaneous regional elections is an impact of the tough nomination threshold requirement. As a result of the tight threshold, some political parties utilize the momentum of regional elections for rent seeking instead of promoting their party cadres to join competition in a fair and democratic way in the regional elections. Not infrequently the candidates nominated are morally flawed: former corruption convicts, even those still in the suspect status.
Political party reform
Beyond the objective need for reforming the system of the general and regional elections, political party reform is no less important. Political party reform is the upstream process to reforming the general and regional elections. Political corruption is basically rooted in political parties that are managed in an unhealthy, personal, closed, and oligarchic manner without any clear ideological commitments. Reforming the general and regional elections will be meaningless if the institutional character of political parties and the characters of their elite remain unchanged.
Likewise, the characterization of party management as if it were a private legal entity that belongs to the founders/general chairpersons should be transformed so the parties become modern political organizations that are open, structured and democratic, and belong to their members.
Political party reform should cover at least two goals. First, is to restore the essential function of political parties as legal and public entities whose sovereignty lies in their leadership and members. Party leadership at some political parties that rests in the hands of “important persons”, such as the founders and/or general chairpersons, must be reformed. Likewise, the characterization of party management as if it were a private legal entity that belongs to the founders/general chairpersons should be transformed so the parties become modern political organizations that are open, structured and democratic, and belong to their members.
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Second, an internal system of integrity must be developed at political parties to minimize the potential for “deviations” and to safeguard the parties against corruption and abuse of power. A joint study by the KPK and LIPI in 2016 identified five elements that political parties should institutionalize in an integrity system: (1) ethical standards and maintenance; (2) internal democratic system, including an urgency to decentralize party management; (3) an inclusive, periodical, hierarchical and sustainable regeneration system; (4) an open, democratic and accountable political recruitment system; and (5) a transparent and accountable financial management system.
The KPK recommended in 2019 a significant increase in state subsidies for political parties that would cover 50 percent of the parties’ annual spending costs.
Yet, political party reform cannot be undertaken unless the parties have adequate sources of funding. The KPK recommended in 2019 a significant increase in state subsidies for political parties that would cover 50 percent of the parties’ annual spending costs. The suggested nominal sum for the state subsidy was Rp 8,461 per vote, to be disbursed in stage to those political parties that had secured seats in the House of Representatives (DPR).
As such, political parties have no reason to delay organizational reform, because their minimum financial costs are covered under the state subsidy. A fundamental change to Law No.2/ 2011 on political parties is needed to bind the parties’ obligation to reform and the state’s duty to subsidize political parties.
The politics of corruption prevention
Reforming the system of the general and regional elections and political parties, in my view, could be a new strategy to prevent corruption in our country. The various efforts that have been made to prevent the crime of corruption, but which neglect the urgency of political reform, may have been superficially successful, but they have often made no real progress. It is unsurprising that corruption remains widespread, even though the measures against corruptors have been intensified from time to time.
Political reform is even inevitable in terms of the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) by Transparency International, in which Indonesia still scores relatively low. Although the country’s score increased slightly in the CPI 2019 from 38 in the previous year to 40 (on a scale of 0-100), and ranked 85th out of the 180 countries surveyed, the increase was primarily due to the country scoring higher in the index’s nonpolitical variables as well as legal.
The Indonesia CPI is an aggregate of nine indexes that refer to global and regional surveys. Three of the indexes, by the Political and Economic Risk Consultancy, the Varieties Of Democracy Project, and the World Justice Project, even contributed the lowest scores to the Indonesia CPI, respectively 36, 28, and 21. In fact, the three indexes measure perceptions on corruption among the political elite at both the national and regional levels, on the quality and management of democracy, and on maintaining legal supremacy, as well as on the abuse of power by executive, legislative and judicial institutions. This means that political reform is inevitable if we want to keep increasing our CPI scores, in addition to the urgency to consistently promote supremacy of the law.
Nonetheless, the KPK cannot be the only body to implement political reform as a new corruption prevention strategy, although systemic improvement, including regulations, is one of the KPK’s focus areas today. Political reform requires the commitment of all stakeholders, especially lawmakers as political party factions in the DPR, as well as government, to make reforming the general and regional electoral system and political parties a new strategy for the future prevention of corruption. Civil society participation is necessary to encourage and convince the various elements of the state that political reform is inevitable in corruption prevention efforts.
Syamsuddin Haris, Research professor, Indonesian Institute of Sciences (LIPI)