Evaluation of the 2019 Simultaneous Elections

DIDIE SW

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The 2019 elections were the first simultaneous elections in Indonesia. A number of circles expressed a belief the elections would significantly improve our political system.

This was expected to happen if a coattail effect occurred and the political intelligence of voters became the basis for constituents’ choice of candidates, both presidential candidates and legislative in the House of Representatives (DPR) and Regional Representatives Council (DPD). However, this assumption has not been proven. The results of the 2019 elections were almost the same as previous elections in which the presidential election and the election of representatives in the House and DPD were held separately.

Why have the simultaneous elections failed to meet expectations? Why did the elections not achieve the three major goals, namely budget efficiency, the generation of significant political power in the House to strengthen the presidential system and the simplification of the number of political parties.

Distortion of the academic assumption

The implementation of the 2019 simultaneous elections was not cheap or efficient. The simultaneous elections "almost" did not provide adequate incentives for the major parties/parties supporting the presidential and vice presidential candidates. The Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P) and Gerindra gained a slight increase of 0.38 and 0.76 percent, respectively. The party that gained the biggest increase was the NasDem Party, 2.33 percent, although the increase in NasDem\'s vote was not considered a coattail effect as Jokowi\'s presidential candidacy was more closely linked to PDI-P, of which he is a member, and not NasDem. Other parties that formed a coalition with Camp 01, such as the Golkar Party, the National Awakening Party (PKB), the United Development Party (PPP) and Hanura, did not perform as well as NasDem. The votes for PKB, which claimed to be supported by Ma\'ruf Amin, only increased by 0.65 percent. Golkar, Hanura and PPP saw their votes drop significantly, by 2.44 percent, 3.72 percent and 2.01 percent, respectively. In Camp 02, the party that experienced a notable increase was the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS), 1.42 percent. The votes for the Democratic Party and the National Mandate Party (PAN) even dropped. The biggest drop was experienced by the Democratic Party, 3.13 percent, followed by PAN 0.75 percent.

As is widely known, the results of elections in the reform era, from the 1999 to 2014 elections, also failed to simplify the number of political parties.

The results of the 2019 simultaneous elections further consolidated the multiparty nature of Indonesian democracy. As is widely known, the results of elections in the reform era, from the 1999 to 2014 elections, also failed to simplify the number of political parties.

Proportional elections, which are combined with a multiparty system, are believed to run counter to efforts to strengthen the presidential system in Indonesia as the multiparty system produced by the elections is an extreme, which makes it difficult for the president to build a coalition. There is no minimum majority winner party because, on average, the winning party receives less than 22 percent of the vote. As a result, the president-elect is deemed to be lacking in sufficient support in the House.

This is evidenced from the number of viable parties in the House produced by the elections before 2019, which tends to be large, ranging from eight to nine. This means competition for political power in the House is fragmented rather than consolidated. This makes it difficult for a president to form a coalition. Experts have debated the effect of the simultaneous elections since the 1980s. The debate has focused on the possible benefits or effects of simultaneous elections and whether they will create a coattail effect and increase voter intelligence.

Campbell\'s study (1960) hypothesized that simultaneous elections would have two impacts. The simultaneous elections function as "political stimulation" to increase participation. The pattern of the coattail effect of a US president in the House and Senate elections is not consistent as at certain times there will be a surge of votes, but at other times there will be a phenomenon of decreased votes. Campbell also underlined that the combination of simultaneity between the president and the majoritarian electoral system encourages the strengthening of certain parties. Interestingly, if the combination is carried out proportionally, the results show the middle party, not the right or left party, as benefiting. The experience of the countries applying the combination mentioned by Campbell can explain why the practice of simultaneous elections in Indonesia tends to favor parties with a centrist ideology rather than the right or left.

From the practice of simultaneous elections in 2019, it turns out that the model of simultaneous general elections or five-box simultaneous elections, "only" guarantees incentives for voter participation.

Some other evidence also shows that the most obvious effect of simultaneous elections is an increase in voter participation. This effect has been referred to in a number of studies that discuss simultaneous elections since the 1980s after Boyd (1989) formulated the voting hypothesis that simultaneous elections increase the number of voters. Lijphart (1997) makes the same argument.

From a number of studies on simultaneous elections, there is a lot of evidence that previous studies did not answer how they affect election results, or whether the simultaneous elections encourage an effective proportional electoral system that simplifies the number of political parties? Although it is undeniable that in some countries there is a slight coattail effect, in several countries that hold simultaneous elections, such as Uruguay, Venezuela and Mexico, the effect is significantly less visible.

Even Brazil’s experience of simultaneous elections did not change the extreme multiparty system, because Brazil still combines proportional and multiparty systems.

Academic distortion, which is built by the drafters of the 2019 Election Law who are too convinced of the initial assumptions of judicial review and have not explored simultaneous election practices, has meant that the public\'s expectations for simultaneous election results have not been met. One of the reasons why simultaneous election results are the same as separate elections is because the design of the electoral system has not undergone fundamental changes, especially in terms of the magnitude of electoral districts (district magnitude), the formula for converting votes into seats, as the application of Saintee League (pure) basically works the same as the voter divider figure (BPP), and the application of legislative thresholds that are still less relevant. The assumption that simultaneity will drive changes in the map of political forces and simplify the number of parties actually has no theoretical backing and is not supported by existing practices.

Will they be continued?

From the practice of simultaneous elections in 2019, it turns out that the model of simultaneous general elections or five-box simultaneous elections, "only" guarantees incentives for voter participation. The coat tail effect and improvement of voter intelligence has not been proven. Meanwhile, its implementation is so complicated, confusing and complex. The burden on election organizers at the polling station working committee (KPPS) level was also very heavy, with hundreds of people even dying.

From the experience of the 2019 elections, the five-box model of the election has created a variety of problems so that maintaining its simultaneous format will lead to debate and "caution" in organizing them.

Learning from the results of the elections and their impacts, a decision will be made on which format to use in the future. This might be decided by Constitutional Court Decree No. 14/PUU-XI/2013 that states that: "the holding of the presidential election after the election of members of representative institutions is unconstitutional so that for the upcoming elections, the presidential election must be carried out simultaneously with the election of members of representative institutions".

The meaning of the Constitutional Court\'s decision is that the elections must be held by applying at least two systems at once. In the 2019 simultaneous election scheme, there are three systems that work together: a system for electing the president, House members and DPD members. From the experience of the 2019 elections, the five-box model of the election has created a variety of problems so that maintaining its simultaneous format will lead to debate and "caution" in organizing them. To overcome this, there are still two models of simultaneity that might be selected and applied. First, separate national and local simultaneous elections. This type of election is a national simultaneous election that elects the president and central government legislative representatives. Second, separate executive-legislative elections, in which executive elections elect the president and regional heads (governors and regents/mayors) simultaneously.

These two models have weaknesses because they cannot guarantee whether there will be a coat tail effect, voter intelligence and party simplification because the problem being solved is ensuring elections are not complicated or complex. With both models, the workload of the election organizers is also not too heavy. Whether or not they will be effective in encouraging the simplification of the multiparty system depends on changes in the electoral system and technical rules.

Moch. Nurhasim, Researcher at the LIPI Political Research Center