Beyond the General Elections
Has the New Order risen again? Is it true that identity politics would lead to the establishment of Unitary Sharia State of the Republic of Indonesia (NKRI Syariah)? These two questions have often appeared in discussions over the past year.
Has the New Order risen again? Is it true that identity politics would lead to the establishment of Unitary Sharia State of the Republic of Indonesia (NKRI Syariah)? These two questions have often appeared in discussions over the past year.
Perhaps this is connected to the rise of old faces in politics and other clamor clad in religious identity issues. There is a vice presidential candidate who never attended a pesantren (Muslim boarding school) who has been suddenly named a "post-Islamist" student. A presidential candidate who was rarely heard quoting Quranic verses is now fluent in the language of the scriptures. The idea of holding a debate in English was responded to with a proposal to debate in Arabic or to hold a contest reciting the Holy Quran.
Democracy always adapts to the context. Therefore, these two proposals are clearly jokes and not contextual. But our affairs go beyond winning and losing. Strategic scenarios need to be conceived to anticipate Indonesia after 2019. There are two possible precedents to consider: (a) the losing politicians trade religion; and (b) radical groups aim to establish a state based on Quranic text. What is worrying is not the statistics, but their strength in influencing a shift in the future foundation and direction of the nation. We use the term "radical" here to refer to groups that want to replace the foundation of the state by justifying all means, including the use of violence.
The radicals use the social penetration models of drug syndicates to create a false dependency on radical principles in dealing with the realities of life’s complications. Meanwhile, the literally heroic set, which may also include us, frequently shout the slogan "the NKRI is a fixed price" [non-negotiable]. It is easy to identify with this when a separatist flag is raised or the troops touch of neighboring countries encroach our borders. What does the slogan mean, though, when radicals infiltrate the bureaucracy, state-owned companies (BUMN) or government offices? Where are we when the radical ranks enter schools and dictate their truth into our children\'s minds or turn "neighborly chats" into radical sermons?
History reads the future
Religious radicalism does not have roots in Indonesian history, even though religious politics is part of our democratic history. In the 1940s, religious discourse emerged in the Jakarta Charter, which was formulated and signed on June 22, 1945 by the Panitia Sembilan (Committee of Nine). It contained two major issues: (a) the principle of “Almighty God, with the obligation to implement sharia among all followers"; and (b) a provision that the president must be Muslim. Another issue, but not a fundamental one, was the use of the word mukadimah (preamble). On Aug. 18, 1945, the charter was amended and enforced to the present day. The decision departed from the constructivist thinking of the founding fathers, who interpreted independence to be the right of all ethnicities, religions, races and tribal groups.
In the Constituent Assembly Session (1956-1959), differing views emerged again. Mohammad Natsir affirmed loudly that the Jakarta Charter was a milestone in achieving the ideals of Islam on Indonesian soil. That firmness was blocked by a nationalist-secular militant group (Feith, 1995) that strongly rejected the idea of sharia.
Therefore, President Soekarno appeared on July 5, 1959 before a hearing with the Res Publica and reaffirmed the original 1945 Constitution. The polemic ended – at least on the surface.
The process was part of the national polemic of that era, when all parties thought within the Indonesian-ness framework. Today, the polemic is infiltrated by the transnational agenda that arrived later. There is even a trend toward turning Indonesia into a "theodemocracy" of Al-Maududi’s (1978) concept in the Middle East. This group is piggybacking on the historical struggle for political Islam in Indonesia.
Entering the 1960s, politics dominated the tense relations between the military (Army), Sukarno and the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI), the prominent power triangle of the time (Feith, 1995). In the 1970s, Soeharto\'s hands broke the tension. The fusion of political parties in 1973 was a forced marriage that was exacerbated by the presence of Golkar, an interest group that acted like a party without being subject to the Political Party Law.
State-religion relations became increasingly bleak when the Soeharto-era country turned into a monster in the 1980s in a number of tragedies, such as the 1984 Tanjung Priok incident. During this period, Islamic activists also emerged and preached at universities against the arrogance of the New Order. Ahead of 1998, they participated in the reform struggle. Hizbut Tahir entered Indonesia in 1983, bringing with them the idea of a universal caliphate. However, the Islamic activists’ struggle differs from that of the Hizbut Tahir Indonesia (HTI), which tended to be exclusive and reluctant to form a party.
Religious politicians
Nevertheless, religious politicians have insisted on supporting religious candidates. Therefore, when the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P) won the 1999 general election, the politicians of religious parties emerged with Quranic verses that argued against women leaders. Megawati was blocked by two major powers: religious politicians and former members of Soeharto’s military who had ambitions to become president. The consensus also led to Abdurrahman “Gus Dur’ Wahid being appointed president. Gus Dur, in accordance with Nahdlatul Ulama traditions, brought enlightenment at the turn of the millennium.
Throughout 1999-2001, religion appeared to be a force that united people and resources toward public welfare. Unfortunately, Gus Dur did not remain in power long. Amien Rais was one of the crucial figures behind Gus Dur’s fall in 2001.
Megawati took the helm and maintained the government. Strangely, the “misogynist” religious doctrine was not vocalized then. Even Hamzah Haz, who was strongly opposed to a female leader in 1999, became vice president in 2001. In the hands of Megawati, democracy was built along a nationalist tradition and progressed through a direct election – even though she lost her position as a result. The 2004 power transition became a turning point of democratic progress, as well as the rise of radicals. HTI and its splinter groups turned against the dream of a caliphate.
For 10 years, the Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono administration (2004-2014) failed to prevent the growth of radicalism, if not nurture them! Its effect was seen in the next political lustrum: the 2014 general election reversed the historical curve.
The victory of the PDI-P, the election of Joko “Jokowi” Widodo as president, and the emergence of Basuki “Ahok” Tjahaja Purnama in Jakarta were three facts that troubled three groups: (a) puritans who dreamed of establishing a caliphate; (b) religious politicians who were anxious about their chances in the next general elections; and (c) a non-nationalist business group that was generally controlled by the political cartel.
The three camps stood united in the 2017 Jakarta gubernatorial election, their first historical encounter that proved immediately effective. Ahok was made into a Trojan horse to rock the Jokowi regime and the nationalists’ status quo. Identity politics had proven capable of uniting the spirit of the innocent grassroots with the pragmatic ambitions of the losing elites. This phenomenon developed into a new stream of electoral democracy.
War of position?
The 2019 general election stands amid this context. Pockets of radicalism continue to grow by utilizing the regional and general elections, and their effect will become evident in the next lustrum. Therefore, the 2019 general election is a war of position between the radicals and the nationalist groups. As a footnote, the political cartel stands between the two and will emerge as the real winner by the end of the process.
Today, identity politics has merged with economic issues. Pockets of student activists are moving to attack the issue of the rupiah, while radical cells move silently at the grassroots. At the elite level, the cartel is busy playing two hands. So who will win the presidential election? The answer is not important, because the urgency is maintaining the resilience of state ideology and public security.
"People know to choose the right one," President Jokowi posted on social media. This belief assumes that our politics is rational. In reality, parochialism is being combined with money games and identity politics. The bookies don\'t care about right or wrong, as the important thing is to win. In fact, Machiavelli (1469-1527) used "justifying all means" in the context of saving the country, not destroying it.
Saving Indonesia\'s future must start in the here and now, hic et nunc! First, strengthening civil society with inclusive nationalist and religious awareness to counter the influence of radical campaigns. Political devices, religious authorities and culture must work synergistically to empower society. The state must pay special attention through social development projects that involve religious and cultural leaders.
Second, the internal management of political parties and and public control over the electoral process must mitigate cartelized politics through mass media and non-governmental organizations. Radical groups do not live in a vacuum; they interact with party elites, including the political cartel.
Boni Hargens, Director, Indonesian Voters Institution