Asymmetrical Decentralization

KOMPAS/DIDIE SW

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After the recent simultaneous regional elections, discourse on the 2025 simultaneous regional elections has attracted public attention, especially surrounding the government’s risk management preparations in conflict-prone areas.

The simultaneous regional elections also raised criticisms against Indonesia’s asymmetrical decentralization. Not all regions in Indonesia are apparently suitable for direct regional elections. In the practice of asymmetrical decentralization in Indonesia, there is envy towards special autonomy regions, namely Jakarta, Aceh, Yogyakarta and Papua. This is especially because of the financial impact of special autonomy. The four provinces are deemed to have strong eligibility for the special status, thereby triggering the asymmetrical decentralization in Indonesia.

The internal conflicts in these special regions are also complex, including conflicts over governance, the local administration’s performance, quality of local regulations, institutional matters, local identities and financial conflicts. Issues with legal impacts at the national level are also complex. These complexities are worsened by the direct regional elections and nationwide interregional envy. These issues should be taken into consideration when implementing regional autonomy policies in Indonesia.

Conceptual development

The concept of asymmetrical decentralization in regional autonomy in Indonesia did not develop overnight. Instead, it has gone through a long process closely related to the rationale of Indonesian nationality. As it turns out, in discussing the decentralization that is inseparable from regional autonomy, Indonesians have never been satisfied with the generic concepts have experts touted. Additional phrases have always been appended to the word “autonomy”, merely as a superlative or to show Indonesians’ dissatisfaction with the entire concept. During the New Order, we had “free and responsible” autonomy. In the Reform era, we have “as expansive as possible” autonomy. And so on and so forth.

Asymmetrical decentralization is inseparable from the generic concept of decentralization. Put simply, decentralization autonomizes the people in a certain region that has been constitutionally turned into an autonomous region (Hoessein: 2011). In Indonesia, we have autonomous regions in the form of provinces, regencies and cities, in accordance with the Constitution. Decentralization, generically speaking, accommodates, nurtures and develops local diversity.

Unfortunately, disputes and anomalies exist in the Indonesian practice. Decentralization experts from various universities have proposed a revitalization of the concept. There are numerous international references on the issue. At first, when we said decentralization, we saw it as synonymous with political devolution, or decentralization as found in international references. Apart from that, all nation-states have collectively carried out measures, namely in the presence of central government representatives in localized administrative divisions, that were developed under the mechanism of de-concentration. Experts sometimes use the phrase “administrative decentralization” to refer to de-concentration.

The two principles are exercised in tandem in all countries that embrace decentralization. This means that the central government has the obligation to regulate, manage and serve the people in the remotest regions, hand-in-hand with the autonomous administration of the regions. Simultaneous management by the two divisions then takes place in managing regional administrations.

The domination of de-concentration has led to dissatisfaction among researchers of decentralization in various countries, including in Indonesia. It is often said that Indonesia has only practiced decentralization administratively, and not politically. This opinion has also emerged in Indonesia. This is a misguided belief, as Indonesia has carried out political decentralization – even if it leaves much to be desired.

UNDP expert Cohen and Peterson issued a list of forms of decentralization (2005) based on a discourse that had been developed by experts of international politics since the early 1980s. According to the Cohen and Peterson, decentralization can be split into administrative decentralization, economic decentralization, fiscal decentralization and political decentralization. They split administrative decentralization further into four types: devolution, de-concentration, delegation and privatization.

Economic decentralization is delegates the regulation of market laws to a lower level of government. Fiscal decentralization relates to assigning a regional administration’s sources of revenue; Political decentralization is an opportunity for federalism; interregional asymmetrical decentralization depends on local political groupings.

This leads to ideas of interregional asymmetry and symmetry. Katorobo (2004) said that asymmetrical and symmetrical decentralization at first concerned center-regional relations. In unitary states, center-regional relations are always asymmetrical. In federal states, sfederal-state relations tend to be symmetrical. Katorobo said that many regional administrations in many nation-states wished for symmetrical relations with the central government, when relations should be asymmetrical.

More recently, experts are talking about the issue in terms of interregional relations. Dissatisfaction in Indonesian decentralization has brought credence to the term, especially in terms of interregional decentralization. They say that relations should be asymmetrical instead of symmetrical between regions. These experts, like many Indonesians, are unconvinced by the concept of decentralization, which is fundamentally a tool to accommodate a nation’s diversity and therefore should be asymmetrical.

There is a wide spectrum of the dissimilarities between regions in Indonesia according to local experts. This spectrum includes accommodation of deeper local identities, including customary laws, indigenous wisdom and knowledge, interregional differences between authorities, the mechanism of regional elections, institutional and fiscal aspects that may be regulated differently between regions.

Debate

Those agreeing with the view that Indonesia should implement asymmetrical decentralization usually support the following views. First, asymmetrical decentralization will satisfy various elements in the regions and can increase regional support for the central government. Second, advanced regions with their own uniqueness will be accommodated. Third, incentives for regions will be stronger.

However, others that reject asymmetrical decentralization are often of the view that: first, decentralization should always create asymmetry, especially if it is aimed to boost interregional diversity, and therefore the term “asymmetry” is not needed. Second, asymmetric patterns create a higher level of legal uncertainty, especially in a unitary state, and this will encourage regions to demand unregulated special treatment. Third, standardized national monitoring will be weaker. Fourth, the ability of the central government to coordinate regional administrations will be weaker in a unitary state, in contrast to a federal state that can bind all diversities by states.

All debate should include the regional administration implemented in Indonesia. Indonesia is a state with a typical integrated prefecture (where governors have the dual function of a regional head and a representative of the central government). If we wish for asymmetry, we should move away from this system to keep things within the contextual conditions of Indonesia.

A plan of asymmetry for Indonesia’s future would be a regulation under which many regions might keep their integrated prefecture, but some may not need to apply such a form of government. The main consideration concerns the direct regional elections. Direct regional elections are not suitable for a country with integrated prefectures like Indonesia. Therefore, if we wish to keep direct regional elections, we should do away with prefectures. However, the fact remains that some regions still need such a system – thus, we can implement asymmetry on this basis.

Here is where we talk about the province of Yogyakarta, which is headed by a sultan. In fact, a sultan should not represent the central government, despite the absence of a direct election in Yogyakarta. Similarly, in the United Kingdom, the ties between the queen and local lords or vassal rulers do not make these lords or rulers representatives of the Queen of England. Therefore, in the UK, there is no such thing as a representation of the government.

In regions without government representation, the elections can be either direct or indirect. One prominent example is Papua. Papua is highly unsuited to a direct election with its noken system – in which village constituents choose a candidate by consensus and the village head casts the representative vote. An indirect election as described in political theory is democratic and does not rob citizens of their constitutional rights. If an indirect noken election is deemed unconstitutional, then many countries in the world would also be unconstitutional – including the UK, Australia, most states in the US and many other countries without direct regional elections. In regions with central government representation, elections are held to select the regional candidates submitted to the central government. Intervention by the central government should still exist if they are to be representative of the government.

Therefore, if asymmetry is applied in the 2025 simultaneous elections, the following will exist in the spectrum of regional election systems: (1) upon candidate proposals by the regional legislative councils (DPRDs) as in the case in Yogyakarta; (2) through DPRD non-absolutely, or through DRPD proposal and a selection system; (3) through the DPRD absolutely; and (4) direct elections. The heavy task of ensuring the contextuality of asymmetrical decentralization involves mapping which regions need integrated prefectures and which do not. Such a map will consequently create a more complex structure for the Home Ministry.

Asymmetry can concern not only the regional elections, but also to civil service management, fiscal management, institutional management and other matters. We had proper asymmetry during the Dutch Indies era. It was a rational form that extended down to the lowest regional autonomy, namely in the different government structures in cities and villages. Interregional asymmetry can also concern the different affairs regions manage. Asymmetry can be accommodated in regional development regulations.

Distributing local affairs under a detailed mechanism based on true autonomy is suitable for regions without central government representation. A central government’s firm sectorial control is necessary to ensure that the regions are capable of handling certain affairs. In contrast, regions with central government representation require control under the government representative and a sectorial ministry. Here, real autonomy can also be developed. The legal structure of the government at the operational level will be more complex. The Home Ministry should be restructured. This is the design of asymmetrical decentralization for Indonesia’s future.

Irfan Ridwan Maksum, Professor and Chair of DeLoGo Cluster, School of Public Administration, University of Indonesia